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 84 SOPHIE BRYANT: an all-absorbing instinct it seems right, holy, morally im- perative. But in such case the impulse has towered with passionate grandeur above reason, has not been at one with the counsels of the one self in which reason and impulse cohere. A part has not only led, but it has usurped the authority of the whole. It is possible, however, to be passionately moved by an imperative instinct, in which reason inheres. We are sometimes moved swiftly to do that of which in a lifetime of reflexion we continue to approve. This happens either because the instinct is itself a profoundly rational one, like courage, or sincerity, or loyalty in affection, or because the impulsive reaction has included such a rapid intellectual survey of the whole matter as to secure that the mandate issued shall be agreeable to the mental content as a whole. One of the educated man's leading instincts is to deliberate always when called upon to act. By practice, as well as innate gift, this instinct may become extraordinarily rapid : this is none other than the quality of " presence of mind," a most pregnant title. " Presence of mind " ; is thus always co-operating instinctively with any other instinct which the occasion may call forth, and the special instinct leaps to its end with the mandate of consciousness in the full sense be- hind it. But the deliberative instinct may not have developed into the perfection of presence of mind; and in that case it retards all instinct, and may even enfeeble the will when the reason itself is dialectically feeble. The most vivid moments of life are doubtless those in which consciousness roused to its utmost limits by some passionate outburst of instinct backs the instinct with unanimous acclaim. But these moments are not given to all, and those who have had them will know of other moments when the eager call for light brought no light in response. It has already been shown how self-consciousness operates for the resolution of the conflict between reason and instinct, and of that between opposing instincts. It may be thought that the habit of deliberativeness is favourable to this pro- cedure, but reflexion on a course of conduct after it has occurred is no doubt the ordinary means of self-revelation. Indeed the person whose instincts are so integrated with his reason as never to give way to unwarranted instinct has not such good opportunities for observing the details of his nature as another would have who acting frequently on pure instinct learns to see, as it were, the parts of himself in his acts. The one moves reason controlled through life,