Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 4.djvu/48



not know whether Mr McTaggart’s interesting investigation (Mind, vol. N. S. 490-504, vol.  190-207) of the relations of the Hegelian Dialectic to Time (or rather to the Time-process ) has obtained the attention it merits, but the problem he has so ably handled is of such vital importance, and the attitude of current philosophy towards it is so obscure, that no apology is needed for a further discussion of his results. That those results came upon me with the shock of novelty I cannot, indeed, pretend; for the impossibility of reconciling the truth of the Dialectic with the reality of the Time-process has long been familiar to me as the chief, and, to me, insuperable difficulty of the Hegelian position. I propose, therefore, to take for granted the reluctant conclusion of Sir McTaggart’s almost scholastic ingenuity, namely that there is no known way of reconciling the (admitted) existence of the Time-process with the (alleged) “eternal perfection of the Absolute Idea” — at all events until some other commentator of Hegelism has attempted to revise and refute Mr McTaggart’s arguments — and I wish to consider what inferences may be drawn from it with respect to the method of metaphysical speculation in general.

Before doing so, however, I ought, perhaps, to say a word on what Mr McTaggart himself inclines to regard as the positive result of his inquiry, the fact namely that he has not been able to show that there is no possible synthesis of the Absolute Idea with the Time-process, and that he is consequently “entitled to believe that one more synthesis remains as yet unknown, which shall overcome the last and most persistent of the contradictions