Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 4.djvu/349

 theory of Appearance and Reality as a whole. By simply labelling things, — individuals, time, space, and so on — as appearances, we have not got rid of them. The term ‘appearance’ seems a false one to apply in this case, for in its very meaning it presupposes at least a duality of the appearing (A) and that to which it appears (B), and again the duality of the real A and the appearing A. A cannot appear to itself, therefore B cannot fall within the appearance of A, unless we divide A into B and C, so that B appears to C and perhaps C to B. But if so, the division within A must be a real, not an apparent one (for to what could the division appear?), and then we have a flagrant case of unity and diversity in the real. Mr Bradley merely avoids the difficulty by making B, the finite individual to which the Absolute (A) appears, itself a part of the appearance of the Absolute, and by insisting that of course the appearance is not absolutely nothing. But this does not disprove the above argument: the appearance, he says, exists, but only as an appearance, that is, according to what seems the only way of interpreting the word, as an act of the Real upon some finite mind producing in it a representation of the Real, which is subject to the limitations of the finite mind; and he contrasts this existence with that of the Real. But it must be again emphasised that the mind to which the real is presented as appearance cannot itself be a part of that appearance, i.e. of its own presentation. It may of course be presented to itself, but this presentation would be merely an appearance of it, would not exhaust its reality Again, we cannot say that each of all finite individuals is an appearance to the others, so that they in some strange way exhaust one another’s reality, and free the Absolute from the taint of their inherence in it. For this would merely bring us back to the difficulty referred to above, of an appearance suspended in the air, with nothing to which it appears, and no rational ground for existence. So that, if the theory is really meant for one of ‘appearance,’ we must admit to finite individuals a reality which is not that of appearance, but as valid as that of the Absolute itself. However, even if we do not lay stress on the meaning of appearance, and suppose that something else is meant, — which we may perhaps be allowed to call ‘modification,’ — then we may come nearer the truth, but the difficulties of the one and many are not settled. They are indeed, emphasized. Above all we have the ground-distinction, beyond which we cannot go, of the Absolute and its Modes. We can give no reason whatever, and it is hopeless to seek one, for the fact that the modifications of the Absolute, and just such modifications, exist; nor can we form any theory of the Absolute as distinct from its modifications. For, in any case, they exist; they