Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 3.djvu/203

 of independence. Thus the apparent imperfection of the universe would be due to the fact that we are regarding it sub specie temporis — an aspect which we have seen reason to conclude that Hegel himself did not regard as adequate to reality. If we could only see it sub specie æternitatis, we should see it in its real perfection.

It is true, I think, that in this way we get a step nearer to the goal required than we do by Hegel’s own theory, which we previously considered. Our task is to find, for the apparent imperfection, some cause whose existence will not interfere with the real perfection. We shall clearly be more likely to succeed in this, in proportion as the cause we assign is a purely negative one. In the former case the appearance of imperfection was accounted for as a delusion of our minds. A delusion is a positive fact, and wants a positive cause, and, as we have seen, it is impossible to conceive this positive cause, except as something which will prevent the imperfection being a delusion at all. Then, however, the cause of the imperfection is nothing but the fact that we do not see everything at once. Seen as we see things now, the world must be imperfect. But if we can attain to the point of looking at the whole universe sub specie æternitatis, we shall see just the same subject-matter as in time; but it will appear perfect, because seen as a single concrete whole, and not as a succession of separated abstractions. The only cause of the apparent imperfection will be the negative consideration that we do not now see the whole at once.

This theory would be free from some of the objections which are fatal to a rather similar apology for the universe often put forward by optimistic systems. They admit that from the point of view of individuals the world is imperfect and irrational, but assert that these blemishes would disappear if we could look at the world as a whole. Such a theory, since it declares that the universe can be really perfect, although imperfect for individuals, implies that some individuals, at any rate, can be treated merely as means and not as ends in themselves. Without inquiring whether such a view is at all tenable, it is at any rate clear that it is incompatible with what is usually called optimism, since it would permit of many — indeed of all — individuals being doomed to eternal and infinite misery. We should be led to the formula in which Mr. Bradley sums up optimism. “The world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil” (Appearance and Reality, p. xiv.). For if the universal harmony can make any evil to