Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/92

 78 HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL: it were wise to attempt, to break down the English use of the word "representation" in strictly psychological discus- sion ; and this will not be needful if it be held constantly in view that it involves no implication of a permanency of the original presentation to which the so-called ' representation ' refers. Sec. 18. On the other hand, when we consider one point it becomes evident that the position here maintained, if ac- cepted, has important bearings upon psychological theory. If, returning to the doctrine as stated by James Mill, it be assumed that what we call representation, or in my terminology secondary presentation, is determined by the permanent existence of the primary presentation in some modified form, then we are naturally led to ask two questions. 1. How does it happen that a given presentation, having once disappeared, ever reappears as a " representation " ? 2. How does it happen that a given presentation, having once appeared, ever disappears ? It is interesting to note that this diversity of point of view, in reference to what is practically the same problem, has had much to do with the development of two great schools of psychological thought. The first way of looking at this problem is that main- tained by the School of Associationists, who tacitly assume a permanent character in presentations. The Associationist psychology has been of great service in recording the move- ment of secondary presentations and in describing their relations to one another, and in noting by careful analysis the common elements between successive appearances of the secondary presentations. It has thus, in a manner, ex- plained the appearance of these secondary trains, showing them to be stimulated in a manner not dissimilar from that which holds for primary trains. But if it be claimed that the doctrine of association has given a fairly satisfactory answer to the question how presentations reappear as " re- presentations," it must surely be agreed that it has given no adequate explanation of the disappearance of presenta- tions ; it has not answered satisfactorily the second question why, having once appeared, do they ever disappear ? This latter question, which was asked as long ago as the time of Diogenes, is distinctly raised by Lotze ; and we have in the Herbartian theory of consciousness an evident at- tempt to reply to this question as well as to the first question above mentioned, and again, on the assumption that pre- sentations are in some manner or measure permanent ; for