Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/594

 580 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. between Prof. Miner and Dr. Baird. III., 12. E. G-. Spaulding. 'The Ground of the Validity of Knowledge,' in. [Argues that knowledge always transcends itself, both in its ' alogical ' forms, (1) memory, because what is remembered is ' beyond ' the memory-act and unalterable by it, (2) imagination, similarly, and (3) perception, which is taken to be of a real object ; and (4) in its ' logical ' form, where the implications transcend the assertion. It is, however, admitted that the ' independence ' of the object may not be ' absolute,' though not apparently perceived, either that the 'transcendence ' is a mere claim, or that it after all falls within the experience-process.] Report of meeting of the Western Philosoph- ical Association and abstracts of papers. III., 13. William James. ' G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy.' [Calls attention to "an extraordinarily well-informed and gifted, and above all an extra- ordinarily free and spirited and unpedantic group of writers," whose programme of an ' Uomo-Dio,' whether to be called, " Promethean or bull- froggian " is ' : one of the possible great type-programmes of philosophy," and contrasts their style with that of the " bald-headed and bald-hearted young aspirants for the Ph.D." of American seminars, who " have all these years been accustomed to bore one another with the pedantry and technicality, formless, un circumcised, unabashed and unrebuked, of their ' papers ' and ' reports '."] V. A. C. Henmon. ' The Detection of Colour-Blindness. 1 [A reduction in colour sense is commoner than is usually supposed, and there are all degrees of ability to discriminate colours, of which colour-blindness is only the lower extreme.] W. B. Pit kin. ' Why Solipsism is rejected.' [Cf. III., 4. Distinguishes be- tween the dogmatic absolutistic solipsism which denies the existence of others, and the negative sort which merely denies the proof of this.] J. R. Angell. 'A Reply to Mr. Marshall.' Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences. III., 14. K. Gordon. ' Metaphysics as a Branch of Art.' ["The truths of art and of metaphysics are felt truths, but are not facts which have at any time been demonstrated."] E. G. Spaulding. ' The Ground of the Validity of Knowledge,' iv. [" It is upon the peculiar and distinctive characteris- tics of the transcendent that knowledge and knowing depend." Their " structure is complex and involved " and the transcendent is the source both of the need and the means of satisfaction.] Report on the Yale Meeting of Experimental Psychologists. III., 15. B. H. Bode. 'Real- ism and Pragmatism.' [Criticises the realism of Hobhouse and G. E. Moore, and concludes that " the endeavour of pragmatism to derive both sense and thought from a more fundamental category is no more suc- cessful than the attempts already noted to reduce all ' acquaintance- with ' to the category of ' knowledge-about,' " which duality seems so far ultimate.] A. E. Davies. ' The Personal and the Individual.' [Both are "differentiations within a given group".] G. Santayana. ' The Efficacy of Thought.' [A comment on A. W. Moore's review. Distinguishes eight senses in which thought may be said to be ' effica- cious,' of which he rejects three, and explains that his book was merely " a biography of human reason," and not " a complete cosmogony ".] III., 16. W. E. Hocking. 'The Group Concept in the Service of Philosophy.' [" The primordial data of mathematics must always be pragmatically denned, in the sense that they express particular results of the character of the concept, and not the character itself." The Group Concept rests on three postulates.] F. L. Wells. ' Linguistic Standards.' [Results of making graduate students supply 'missing words' in a context.] T. P. Bailey. 'Snapshot of an Association Series.' [Infers that 'real association is fundamentally social' and dependent on practical interests.] III., 17. M. P. Mason. 'Reality