Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/502

 488 HUBERT FOSTON : objects is a corollary of their reflected mediate interest depending on their semiotic function. I should exhibit the rationale of abstraction by saying that in order to avail my- self pointedly of one object or objective phase as the undis- tracted and distinct sign of another, I must somehow be enabled to regard it specially in so far as it is such a sign. This must be, not now under the elementary conditions of an experience that is, as it were a priori, narrowly selective, but in full face of the unconcealed totality of the qualities of an object as presented to the advanced and expanded form of mind. Let attention be determined to some one of the perhaps very various and conflicting associated portentive suggestions of the presented totality determined to it by its possibly still further mediately conferred interest. There may thus forthwith be brought into play that capacity for reinforcing an image into effective competition with even perceptual forces, which is perhaps distinctive of the human mind, wherein, as we shall see, it subserves the function of reason. Then let the embarras de richesse of qualities and nascent suggestivenesses l have been what it may I am, so to speak, associatively looking on one clear, determined line through the object ; and herein, looking through but not overlooking, have achieved abstraction. A secret, for example, of the abstract regarding of an object as " fusible " is the controll- ing maintenance of an image of it as in a fluid state, with some more or less definite connective consciousness of phe- nomena which by experience are found likely to be inter- mediate between the actual solid and fluid states.' 2 But if, neglecting whatever individualising aspects and claims on notice an object might otherwise have for me, I so yield to the associated goal of interest as to make it for my mind merely an object that can be used in some par- ticular way to a certain effect, or an object that is a sign of such and such an oncoming eventuality, then it and all objects, so far forth as this one mentally selected interest attaches to them, are appealing to me in the name of a 1 Each of which might have its proper moment for development. 2 The relatively direct and definite practical line of reference here, approximating the instance to what may reasonably be deemed the primitive type, lays it open to elementary treatment. Were we to go further, and attempt to explain any well-developed abstract regarding of an object in its " fluidity " not necessarily implied, it may be agreed, in the largely concrete abstraction-guiding image of a fluid object as- sumed above we should require assistance from the principles of sections iii. and iv. which are concerned with the arrest and suspense of the deter- mination of significance.