Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/494

 G. VAILATI : strive (ftia6(jievoi) to establish the existence of incorporeal things, only to be apprehended by thought. Both parties, i.e., both those who refuse to describe as existing what they cannot touch and press with their hands (rat? xepvl Tne^eiv} and the others whom he describes as the friends of the ideas (rwv ei8a)v iot) are induced to admit that everything exists which has any capacity (Sw/a/u?) for acting and suffering actions (iroielv rj iraOelv) in however small a degree (teal a-fjiiKporarov) and even only for once (KOI el povov et<? a?raf, Soph.,. 247, E). But Plato is not contented with concluding that the ii&rf exist (elvai ri}. They are for him something even more truly existing (dr/0axf ov) than material things, something superior to them in value/ and power (Trpecrftei teal Swdpei irrrepe^ovra^ Rep.}. The argument by which he most frequently supports his assertion consists in saying that it is by the etSr/ by their presence or by resemblance to them, that material things- themselves exist and are what they are. A comparison of this phrase with the others in which th& capacity of beholding the eiSr/ is described as a necessary condition of being able to reply to questions of the type i What is such a thing ? and of deciding whether an object deserves or not to be called by a given name (Euthyphr., 6 E., et? Kivrjv d7ro/3rcav teal ^pco/u-ei/o? avrfj TrapaSeiyfiart o /Mv roiovrov dv rj <f)(o O<TIOV elvai o &av fir/ roiovrov fj,r/ fyoy ; cf. also Meno, 72 G) suffices to convince us of the perfect correspondence of the sense attributed by Plato to the word e'iSr/ with that which the word ovcrla assumes in Aristotle, and also with that now expressed by the words meaning or con- notation. The very observations which have been made on that phrase of Porphyry (Isag., c. iii.) in which the essential properties of a given thing are defined as those with the cessation of which it would cease to be what it is, may in fact be applied here also, inasmuch as to say that it is by the presence of a given etSo? or by resemblance to it that a given thing is, or continues to be, what it is, is not fundamentally- different from saying that it is on account of such presence or resemblance that we call it by its own name and that we should cease to call it so if such presence or resemblance ceased or were shown to be illusory. It seems to me indispensable to keep in mind the consider- ation mentioned above in order to recognise the meaning and force of the phrases in which the et'&j? are described as not subject to change and alteration (/MeTa^or/v rfvrivovv OVK doUa(riv ovBeficav evBe^ofjueva, Ph&do, 78) ; as