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 NEW BOOKS. 431 ieh as that which attends on taste or smell. "Their enjoyment is lysically unlocalisable ; it is an enjoyment of the soul, a consent, an jprobation accompanied by pleasure which the soul bestows on a quality the object ... a pleasure of the soul void of sensory tone " like that k'hich accompanies the approval of goodness or intelligence. Can this rp separation be maintained '? In treating of expression the author insists that the lower senses can give rise to beauty of expression though not to the true beauty of sense (the scent of new-mown grass has ex- pressive beauty, artificial perfumes have not beauty of sense ; " in the former case the soul judges, in the latter, the nose "). There is truth in this ; but when the lower senses are admitted to conjoin these distinct aspects of sense and soul, can the higher senses be restricted to one ? Is there not in the greed of colour or brightness the same sensuous character which we know in the covetousness of the " lower " senses ? The underlying question of principle is whether some deeper principle than the de facto character of the different senses would not have to be produced, if we are to account for the line between the pleasant and the sautiful of sense. In the Beauty of Relation which may be beauty of sense there is Iways a demand or expectation or reference, a " pretesa," according to- vhich we judge the presentation. In applying this view to typical jeauty the author makes an ingenious suggestion for solving Burke's difficulty if the normal of the species is the beautiful, how can beauty be novel or compatible with novelty ? The author replies that while the abnormal is ugly, the common normal is only neutral and not beautiful. Beauty only appears in case of a coincidence with type which (the coincidence) is exceptional and not normal ; the type here concerned eing ' a kind of ideal resultant in which the various components of the erience find their equilibrium ; a form in which all the differences too much and too little are eliminated". It is not, therefore, the Duunon normal, or average. We should like to know more about this 36, but there might be a danger cadere nella metafisica. The above of course a gallant attempt to escape from the difficulty of accounting beauty of relation on the basis of mere association. The author is anxious to maintain the pure subjectivity of beauty, and seems hardly to recognise that subjective genesis by association is compatible with any degree of objectivity of value, and that the latter is what we wish Esthetic to explain. The same reference to an exceptional case of a character commonplace in itself is employed to explain the beauty of imitative art (only exceptionally skilled or difficult imitation has artistic value) and the " beauty of judgment " in the account of literary process- (the exceptionally true or profound judgment may be called beautiful) ; hat we should call an inspired saying. The book is well written, and full of acute remarks and apposite in- inces. But the writer's repugnance to an "objective beauty'' (though takes this merely to mean a beauty apart from perception) prevents- from unifying his views. B. BOSANQUET. Received also : Ifred William Benn, The History of English Rationalism in the Nine- teenth Century, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1906, 2 vols.,. pp. xxviii, 450, and xii, 533. lenry Sturt, Idola Theatri, a Criticism of Oxford Thought and Thinkers from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism, London, Macmillan,. 1906, pp. xvii, 344.