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 NEW BOOKS. 427 The author has made a name for himself in Germany by a number of books, pamphlets, and articles in philosophical periodicals, in which he appears in the role (somewhat rare in the annals of Kant-criticism) of an ' orthodox ' Kantian, ready to defend the entire self-consistency of Kant's critical philosophy and to accept it as the final solution of philosophical problems. Hence he wages a vigorous and merciless war on the vagaries of current Kant-criticism, and attempts to show that the self-contra- dictions which successive generations of Kant-critics have professed to find in Kant's pages, as well as most of the textual alterations and emendations proposed by them, are mainly due to simple failure to under- stand Kant's meaning. It cannot be denied that in many instances Dr. Goldschmidt's attacks on the Kant-philologen seem well-deserved, and in any case, his whole-hearted defence of Kant is as refreshing as it is valuable. More especially he deserves the gratitude of every Kant- student for his reprint of G. A. S. Mellin's Marginalien und Register zu Kant's Kritik der Erkenntnisverrnogen, first published in 1794-5 and praised by Kant himself, and for a facsimile reproduction of the first edition of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, original copies of which are nowadays very hard to obtain. The first essay in the book under review deals with an apparently minute point of textual criticism, viz. , whether Kant meant to write ' kerne Privat-meinungen ' or ' reine Privat-meinungen ' in the last sentence but one of the paragraph on the ' discipline of the pure reason in regard to hypotheses ' (A. 781, B. 810). Most editors follow Hartenstein in adopting the latter reading, but Dr. Goldschmidt by an elaborate dis- cussion of the Kantian distinction between knowledge and faith, scientific hypotheses and practical postulates, succeeds in showing that the reading ' keine ' is demanded by the context. The second essay is a severe criticism of some of the textual emenda- tions and corrections adopted into the new edition of Kant's works by the Prussian Academy of Sciences. Dr. Goldschmidt seems right, not only in showing that some of the readings adopted manifestly pervert the sense of Kant's argument, but also in his general criticism of the whole method of the ' critical apparatus ' appended to the text of that edition, as serving merely to perpetuate the record of all the countless misinterpretations with which the path of Kant-criticism is strewn. If Dr. Goldschmidt's censures are justified, as they seem to be, the Academy-edition will not have made good its claim to be authoritative and final. Whatever may be the merits of Dr. Goldschmidt's criticism in each individual case, there can be no doubt that he is one of the most thorough, earnest and sympathetic of Kant-students, whose views for this very reason demand attention and respect. R. F. ALFRED HOERNLE. Saggi sulla Teoria delta Conoscenza. Saggio Secondo : Filosofia della Metafisica. Da COSMO GUASTELLA. Palermo, 1905. 2 vols. Pp. 762 + 1044. Eight years ago I gave an account in this Review (MiND, vol. vii., N.S., p. 576) of Prof. Guastella's first essay on the theory of knowledge. The present work represents the same point of view, but displays wider knowledge and still higher powers of philosophical reasoning. To be sincere, in my opinion it places the author in the front rank not only of Italian but of European criticism as an expert in the history of philosophy.