Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/428

414 appears from the apprehension of processes. When a melody is apprehended, for example, we must be hearing all the notes which compose it, yet some at least of them are already past. In fact, simultaneity is merely a limit, which may be realised when the aspection begins; but every aspection lasts for more than an instant, and therefore must be subsequent to its object except, at best, at the instant when it begins. An aspection is not to be called a perception unless there is such an instant of simultaneity (p. 68); and as the interval of time increases, an aspection becomes less trustworthy. It is distinguished from memory by the fact that in memory the object is judged to be past, while in an aspection it is throughout judged to be present. (It is difficult to reconcile this with the instance of the melody, where the earlier notes must be judged as past if the melody is to be apprehended.) Judgments of memory are evident, but not evidently certain: they are evident presumptions (Vermuthungen) a rather difficult notion, which ought to be justified at greater length.

The third section contains a very intricate and difficult theory as to internal perceptions, of which the following is an outline: A presentation of red requires a certain content, but the occurrence of this content is not yet the apprehension of the object, which requires an act, over and above the passive presentation. If now internal perception possesses itself of the content, it does not do so by a new content: the mere experiencing of the content suffices, together with an act which is different from that by which the red was apprehended. These two acts are called respectively Auswärtswendung and Einwärtswendung (p. 58). This theory is regarded by Prof. Meinong as an essential part of his argument. It is forced on him by the difficulty of apprehending contents as opposed to their objects.

The fourth section returns to external perception, and endeavours to rehabilitate it as far as possible. It is first pointed out that, if external perception is wholly rejected, all knowledge of the external world becomes impossible. There is a summary criticism of various forms of idealism—too summary, except for those who already accept Prof. Meinong's conclusions. There is also a good criticism of the view that external objects are inferred as the causes of sensations. It is pointed out that, even if the objects whose existence is to be thus inferred are to be found in the chain of causes, there are other nearer causes, as well as more remote ones, and no reason can be given for stopping at one particular point. Thus the external world is only knowable if the senses are more or less trustworthy.

Although the plain man can be induced to admit that the sensible qualities of things are subjective, he can hardly be got to admit that the things do not exist at all. In this Prof. Meinong