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 412 CRITICAL NOTICES : In chapter viii. the famous answers of the judges returned by them to the House of Lords in 1843 are submitted to a searching criticism in the light of the foregoing discussions. The author concludes that in spite of the ambiguity of these answers, the administration of the law is satisfactory. As regards the perennial dispute between the lawyers and the physicians, the author takes up a sound midway position and does not, like so many physicians, hold it to be the sole duty of the medical witness to prove insanity and to secure to the offender immunity from punishment. W. McDouoALL. Ueber die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens. By Dr. A. MEINONG, o. 6. Professor an der Universitat Graz. Ab- handlungen zur Didaktik und Philosophie der Naturwissen- schaft. Band i., Heft 6. Berlin, 1906. Pp. 113. THIS book, though stated in the preface to be addressed rather to men of science than to philosophers, is full of discussions by which philosophical readers are likely to profit, and is by no means free from philosophical difficulties. Its object is to consider when and how far we can rely upon what appear to be perceptions, whether of physical or of psychical existents. The author keeps as near to a common-sense view of the world as he can, departing from it only when he is compelled by some quite irrefutable argument. On the whole, reality is to be congratulated on passing its ex- amination so creditably ; for the net result is that, though things are usually a little different from what they seem to be, they are seldom very different. In this conclusion common sense will readily acquiesce, though many subtleties are traversed in reaching it. The introduction explains the difference between the d priori and the empirical (as here used) to be that the former does not assert existence, and is necessary. Both are to apply only to judgments, not to presentations ; thus "red differs from green " is d priori, although the presentations of red and green are derived through the senses. Only what is not d priori is based on experi- ence. The first section is devoted to defining perception, on which all derivative empirical knowledge depends. A perception is always a judgment, not a presentation, for in perceiving we are convinced that the object perceived exists. Moreover, if perception were not a judgment, it could not be a means of obtaining knowledge, which it is universally admitted to be. A judgment such as " the tree is green" is not a perception, but a result of analysing a per- ception : every perception is an existential judgment, not one attributing a quality to a thing. The objects of perception are primarily things, not qualities, and things are not mere complexes of qualities. (The notion of thing, which becomes very prominent