Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/415

 G. GALLOWAY, Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. 401 3ut on page 191 : " The real on which the ideational activity of the subject works in constructing the phenomenal world is, on this riew, manifold spiritual substances or causalities ; and the diverse qualities of the world, as given in experience, would be grounded the various activities of these substances. The basis of the phenomenon termed matter is, on this theory, an inner life which allied to our own consciousness." This is a favourite mode of metaphysical idealism at the present lour, and it cannot be reasonably doubted that its claim to over- >me a greater number of difficulties than any other theory is very rong. But, besides the obscure problem of the relation of these lusal centres, these clots of reality, to the ultimate system or the Lbsolute, I cannot see as yet that this view is successful in explain- ig the appearance of matter. How, if all reality is at bottom spiritual, should we have even the illusion of that which is non-spiri- lal ? At all events, if it is valid to argue (p. 65) that you cannot jplain the illusion of activity and spontaneity without implicitly Dnceding that such activity and spontaneity in the Self are real, is Lgain, the very language in which we are compelled to state the leory seems to create difficulties for it. Grant that the inner nature things is spiritual ; is it then involved that they have an outer iture which is not? Just as Mr. Bradlaugh could always vote ice oftener in the House of Commons than his vote could be lisallowed, because he could vote on the motion to disallow his. so, protest as often as we may that the basis of the phenom- ion called matter is an analogue of our own consciousness, it till appears to be implied that this analogue is somehow clothed ipon with a non-spiritual vesture or external manifestation, the lusion of matter being thus produced. Howdo spiritual substances >me to cast this " material " shadow? Does not an impenetrable rd remain to the end ? Not so much for pure idealism, perhaps ; it surely for a thinker who holds, as Mr. Galloway does, that sals exist and are active trans-subjectively. These objections are lot sufficient to deter us from acceptance of a theory of this 3tzian type, but they are points on which it needs to come to jrms somehow with its critics. The distinction between inner and outer experience being thus vindicated, the writer proceeds with his argument for a World- round which not only forms the principle of existence and unity the spiritual substances aforesaid, but is in harmony " with the iplications of inner experience, with the realm of self-conciousness id those personal aspirations and ethical values which form an ssential aspect of the self-conscious life ". The thought moves sadily past Leibnitzian and Lotzian positions, rejecting them iccessively, as partially true, but ultimately unsatisfying, conclu- lons. Prof. Royce's impeachment of realism, as committed to the ssertion of individual reals, which are per se eternally complete id self-sufficing, is vigorously repudiated ; for no principle of being
 * quite incompetent to turn the same argument in another direction ?