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 G. GALLOWAY, Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. 399 the higher levels of teleological thought. This leads up to some- fresh and valid writing on the intrinsic character of moral freedom. There is that in moral action, we are told, which differentiates it qualitatively from mechanical process, while at the same time vetoing its interpretation in terms of spiritual determinism. To say that action is necessarily determined by character is to forget that, " in point of fact, man in his temporal history has never unified his character so completely as to exclude the possibility of an alternative in conduct" (p. 69). Otherwise, it is futile to try to make sense of facts like repentance and moral obligation. This is interesting, as suggestive of a growing company of fully-equipped philosophers who refuse any longer to profess satisfaction with the deterministic substitutes for moral interpretation current twenty years ago, and who are supported in their resolve to be heard by the conviction that, whether from the human or the divine point of view, evil is that which " ought not to exist," but which nevertheless does exist, as being created by the volition of finite beings. Mr. Galloway further pleads, and it is one of the most fruitful ideas of this essay, that not only is moral freedom something that grows, but that it can attain perfection only in a perfect environment. Thereafter he passes, by way of a searching examination of the idea of self-reali- sation, in which he discusses ably the relation of the ideal self to the actual, to the conclusion " that a Supreme Ideal must in some way be real, if the ends of conduct are to be co-ordinated, if partial ideals are to be transcended ". On the other hand, this appears to lead to an insoluble antinomy between the moral progress of the self in time, and the timeless and perfect Self which we must postu- late if there is to be any true standard of value. Nothing, accord- ingly, can remove this obstacle to thought but to transcend the moral consciousness as such, so finding in Eeligion the proper goal and the necessary completion of Ethics. These are ideas which, in a somewhat different form, have received prominence in the writings of Mr. Bradley and Mr. Taylor, with their contention that thought, if it is to be consistent, must finally move jenseits Gut und Bose ; and it may be said here that Mr. Galloway's treatment of the subject, for inner truth and philosophic justice to the interests con- cerned, need not shrink from comparison with theirs. Leaving on one side Essay III., on " Eeligious Development: History and Interpretation," as of less significance from the philosophical point of view, though suggestive and closely packed, let us come to Essay V., in which the book's real centre of gravity is placed. Its title is " The Ultimate Basis and Meaning of Eeligion ". Ontological speculations, we are told at the outside, being difficult to verify, all we can ask in the Philosophy of Eeligion is " that they give a coherent view of the facts in their broad features, and that, to some extent at least, they impart a satisfying meaning to them " (p. 210). Perhaps it is just because it shares this so modest view of the capacity of human intelligence for ultimate speculation, d accepts from metaphysicians like Mr. Galloway a rather dis- cer ..'