Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/400

 386 F. c. s. SCHILLER: on a vital point. Does " the origination by individuals of changes in the temporal order of events " include alterations in their own thoughts and those of others ? If it does, ' practice ' will spread over the whole of Prof. Taylor's ' theoretic ' field : if it does not, all human agency will be excluded from ' practice '. l In either case the definition reduces to absurdity. 1 must warn him further that in formulating my theory of knowledge I have always laid the chief emphasis not on its re- lation to 'practice,' but on its relation to purpose. The 'useful- mess ' of truth is a direct corollary, not from the supremacy of ' practice ' over ' theory,' but from the purposiveness of thought. 'That is why I have repeatedly and unequivocally contended that 1;here is no such thing as 'theory' independent of 'practice,' because ultimately both are relative to purpose. 2 Our critics, on ihe other hand, while descanting on this antithesis, have been strangely silent about the more fundamental doctrine which trans- cends it. Prof. Taylor therefore has a great opportunity of show- ing himself superior to his friends by telling us whether or not he .admits the purposiveness of mental life, and if he does, whether or not he thinks that it influences our cognitive activities 3 And it is the more imperative that intellectualists should speak out on ihis point, because if it is conceded, the whole of the pragmatic theory of knowledge may be shown to follow inevitably. It follows from this that, when a truth is said to be useful, it may be so for any purpose, however ' theoretic ' it may seem in the first instance, though ultimately, when the systernatisation of ends is fully carried through, it must be useful also for the highest end of life, i.e. for what I should call ' practice '. Hence a pro- position concerning the ideal creations of a science like arithmetic is true when (1) it tends to the development of the science, or (2) of another science, or (3) that science as a whole has useful applications to human life. It is unreasonable to expect every detail to be directly applicable ; but when a system of thought loses its application to life it ceases to be a science, and becomes
 * an intellectual game and is useful only as such. 4

If this be borne in mind it will scarcely be necessary to con- cern ourselves very elaborately with the technical analysis and justification of what are called ' transfinite numbers '. In spite of its formidable appearance I have been utterly unable to detect any relevance in Prof. Taylor's 'illustration,' and cannot conceive 1 1 may suggest as an alternative that to define the practical as 'wliatever tends to tie control of events 1 will be found fairly adequate to the sense in which the word has been used by us. 2 N.S, 52, p. 533, and N.S., 55, pp. 361-362, which latter passage Prof. Taylor ignores in spite of the italics and the direct application to himself. 3 Cp. N.S.,54, p. 237. 4 1 have never denied the existence and academic importance of such intellectual games. Nor does Pragmatism deny their usefulness as such. It is only disposed to question whether (like other games) they have not been a little overdone.