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 378 F. C. S. SCHILLER : queer to apply to those eminent writers for a guarantee of a Bradleian metaphysic, seeing that both of them have published searching criticisms of Appearance and Reality, and that it is quite easy, and even necessary, to understand and develop the doctrines of both in a pragmatist way. (2) Prof. Taylor assures us that it is a misapprehension to regard his phrase about ' the instinctive demand of the intellect ' as an approximation to our views. It was prompted by an aphorism of Aristotle's and a jest of Mr. Bradley's. 1 I fully believe it. But here again the question is as to the justification. For what business have ' instincts ' and ' demands ' in what professes to be a pure rationalism? The addition "of the intellect" no doubt makes a difference. But, I should have thought, for the worse* For if ' instincts ' and ' demands ' penetrate into the very intellect, does not this go far to prove our contention that the intellect itself is not ' purely ' intellectual ? And of course nothing I said ever implied that I regarded this single remark as ' committing ' Prof. Taylor to the whole pragmatic doctrine. (3) As regards the admission of postulates into science Prof. Taylor's explanation seems to read a little lamely. He mentions no sources for his inspiration, but excuses himself for ascribing a postulatory structure to science on the ground that no one could help seeing it. I could applaud the sentiment without reserve, did I not remember how very recent the discovery is, and how long the principles of all the sciences were all supposed to be ' axiomatic ' truths. And even now it is incomplete. Prof. Taylor himself retains ' axioms ' in metaphysics, although (as I have shown and as he has not attempted to dispute) he gives no clear account of what they are, how they are to be known and how they are to be distinguished from postulates. He merely appeals to the very deceptive (and entirely psychological) test of ' self-evidence '. He likewise excepts from the general pro- cedure of the sciences the single science of arithmetic, in which he is confident that no postulates can be found. Thus arithmetic, in spite of its scientific isolation, appears to be " the one pinpoint of the truth " upon which, more heroically though more painfully than St. Simeon Stylites, Prof. Taylor once peroratingly declared himself willing to take his lifelong stand. 2 Now he had said all this before, 3 and I had duly noted it. But unfortunately the nature of arithmetical assumptions is too large a subject to be discussed on this occasion. It may however give Prof. Taylor some suspicion of the real complexity of these alleged 1 For presumably no one would be willing seriously to describe I metaphysic as " the finding of bad reasons for what one believes upon instinct ". Before evolving a serious doctrine out of it Prof. Taylor should have reflected that the brilliant epigrams of which it forms one must have been put into the preface of Appearance and Reality because they would not have fitted into the text. 2 McGill University Magazine, p. 66. 3 L. c., p. 55.