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 316 J. S. MACKENZIE : In the former case, it seems clear, in spite of both Plato l and Mr. Moore, that there is no meaning in speaking of pleasure except as the experience of some individual con- sciousness. It is true, indeed, that I can think of pleasure without having it ; and this fact seems, at first sight, to present considerable difficult} 7 ; for it seems to imply that we can represent pleasure to ourselves by means of some other characteristic than that of its being felt. This is a point to which I intend to return. Setting this aside for the present, it seems to me that there is no doubt that we can only think of a pleasure which is not directly present to us as a past or future pleasure of our own or as the pleasure of some other sentient being. A mountain-peak which is in- accessible to us is, none the less, a mountain-peak. The other side of the moon, which we cannot see, is as much of a reality for us as that which we can see. Perhaps also there is some sense in which it can be maintained that a colour which no one can see is a real colour ; but I cannot find any intelligible meaning in the statement that a pleasure which is quite unattainable by any one is a real pleasure. In the case of a geometrical axiom the conditions are very different. Take, for instance, the statement ' If equals are added to equals, the wholes are equal '. Can it be properly said that the judgment here expressed is something that exists in any one's mind ? Certainly, when any one discovers the truth of it for the first time, or recalls it to his recollec- tion, or tries to explain it to some one else, some psychical process is taking place in his mind. But is that psychical process the judgment ? It seems clear that it cannot be ; for the judgment is the same for every one who understands it, whereas the psychical process is different every time the judgment is formed. It would seem, therefore, that in this case we have an objective content that is distinguishable from the subjective fact of experience. But this, you may say, is nothing more than the familiar distinction between an idea as fact and an idea as meaning, which is so much emphasised by Mr. Bradley in his Logic, and which is applied in so enlightening a way in Prof. Stout's Psychology. Certainly, I do not claim that it is anything more than this ; but I doubt whether, in spite of its familiar- ity, all that is involved in it is often quite clearly realised. I doubt even whether Mr. Bradley himself always keeps it 1 Aristotle, as well as Plato, seems to give some countenance to the view that pleasure is separable from the consciousness of it. He recog- nises, that is to say, like Plato, a distinction between real pleasure and the appearance of pleasure.