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 314 J. S. MACKENZIE : by at least one of the leading representatives of modern Idealism Dr. Edward Caird. 1 It can only be supposed to tell against Idealism in so far as Idealism is understood to rest upon the principle that ' esse is percipi '. Now, what I wish to maintain is that Idealism, when its meaning is rightly understood Idealism, as we find it put forward by its best exponents, such as Plato among the ancients and Hegel among the moderns does not depend, even in the slightest degree, upon the principle that ' esse is percipi '. I would even go farther, and maintain that all idealism worthy of the name including even that of Berkeley himself de- pends upon the absolute rejection of that principle. In order to bring this out, however, it is necessary to consider a little more precisely in what sense the objectivity of the world of our experience is to be understood. Mr. Moore's position, as I understand it, will here afford us a convenient starting-point. He draws a sharp distinction between consciousness and the objects that are set before it, representing each as having an existence quite independent of the other. Thus, if I see a tree, there is the tree, on the one hand, and my consciousness of it, on the other. But, equally, if I feel hunger, there is hunger, on the one hand, and my feeling of it, on the other. If I think that two and two make four, there is the truth of two and two making four, on the one hand, and my consciousness of it, on the other. Even if I am simply pleased, this experience may be analysed into the two quite distinct elements, pleasure and my feeling of it. 2 Put in this way, the position is a highly paradoxical one ; and I do not think that it can be really defended against some very obvious criticisms. It is rightly urged against it, in particular, that we know nothing of a consciousness divorced from all objective reference. To affirm such an 1 See his book on Kant, jmssim ; and cf. his recent paper on ' Idealism and the Theory of Knowledge' in the Proceedings of the British Acn<l(mi. The following sentences from his book on Kant may be more particularly noted. ' Properly speaking, ideas cannot be treated as states of an indi- vidual subjectivity, but only sensations ; for ideas imply a reference to the " I think " on the one side, and to the object on the other. An idea always stands for something, is a symbol of something else than itself, to the ego that has the idea. But for that reason, it must be contem- plated as other than a state of the subject for which it is ' (vol. i., pp. 640-641). ' Idealism, in the proper sense the doctrine that the reality of the material object lies ultimately in its necessity as an element in the evolution of spirit' (p. 644). These passages really sum up all that I have to say in this paper. 2 This last point is brought out, with special emphasis, in the Principia Ethica.