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 THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 297 nothing of the complexity of its origin and structure. In this case we should have simply another picture. But we may also suppose that the blur of the photograph suggests the superimposition of others and something of their character. Then we get another, and for our problem, much more fruitful kind of persistence. We will imagine that the final G assumes this form : Gratification terminat- ing movement induced by smell. The smell is still present ; it has persisted. It is not present in its original form, but is represented with a quality, an office, that of having excited activity and thereby terminated its career, in a certain quale of gratification. It is not S, but 5* ; that is S with an incre- ment of meaning due to maintenance and fulfilment through a process. S is no longer just smell, but smell which has excited and thereby secured. Here we have a cognitive, but not a cognitional thing. In saying that the smell is finally experienced as meaning gratifi- cation (through intervening handling, seeing, etc.) and mean- ing it not in a hapless way, but in a fashion which operates to effect what is meant, we retrospectively attribute intellec- tual force and function to the smell and this is what is signified by ' cognitive '. Yet the smell is not cognitional, because it did not knowingly intend to mean this ; but is found, after the event, to have meant it. Nor again is the final experience, the 2 or transformed S, a knowledge. Here again the statement may be challenged. Those who agree with the denial that bare presence of a quale in con- sciousness constitutes acquaintance and simple apprehension, may now turn against us, saying that experience of fulfil- ment of meaning is just what we mean by knowledge, and this is just what the S of our illustration is. The point is fundamental. As the smell at first was presence or being, less than knowing, so the fulfilment is an experience which is more than knowing. Seeing and handling the flower, en- joying the full meaning of the smell as the odour of just this beautiful thing is not knowledge because it is more than knowledge. As this may seem dogmatic, let us suppose that the fulfil- ment, the realisation, experience, is a knowledge. Then how shall it be distinguished from and yet classed with other things called knowledge, viz., reflective, discursive cognitions ? Such knowledges are what they are precisely because they are not fulfilments, but intentions, aims, schemes, symbols of overt fulfilment. Knowledge, perceptual and conceptual, of a hunting dog is prerequisite in order that I may really hunt with the hounds. The hunting in turn may increase