Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/242

 228 H. A. PEICHAED : to be so and so '. And it is just this objectivity of perception which, is the main factor in the transition from the view that we know ' things only as they appear ' to the view that we know only appearances. We hesitate to assert that objects are so and so for perception and therefore transform this statement into another, viz., that the appearances of objects are so and so. By making the appearance into a new object, we gain a new and suitable sub- ject of assertion because, as an appearance, it admits of no dis- tinction between what it is and what it is for perception. The new statement, however, is obviously false. Not only is the assertion ' the look of the moon is not as large as the look of the sun ' not the equivalent of ' the moon looks as large as the sun ' but it is not sense. There is the same absence of meaning in the statement in which Kant's view that space is a phenomenon ought to find expression, viz., 'the look of things-in-themselves is spatial'. (2) The statement ' the moon looks as large as the sun ' is only in appearance an assertion about present perception. It is not true that I now perceive the moon to be as large as the sun. It is not so for my perception. For, as has already been urged, per- ception implies the belief that what I perceive is as I perceive it.. The true meaning of the statement is, ' If I were to forget my position as an observer, I should assert that I perceived the mooa to be as large '. The theory in question takes ' look ' to mean ' is for perception,' which as opposed to what ' really is ' involves a contradiction. ' Look ' properly means ' would be perceived to be, if certain conditions were forgotten '. The proper way to describe the process of taking into account the conditions under which we perceive, is to state it as a process of 'discounting' or 'correction'. We begin with an immediate judgment of perception, ' I perceive the moon to be as large as the sun '. Then reflexion on my position as an observer forces me to modify this judgment, and I assert, ' The sun is really larger, though if I were to forget the difference of distance, I should say that I saw it to be as large '. The point is that the immediate judgment of perception does not remain side by side with the judgment that corrects it. And only if it remained could I say, ' for my percep- tion the moon is as large '. The fact is that the hold of the phenomenalist view upon us- arises from the almost inexpugnable conviction that the distinction between appearance and reality involves two distinct things, objects and their appearances. It is this conviction which lends colour to- the view that when we have discovered that something is not really so and so, it still is so for perception. For it enables us to assert that the appearance remains, even when we have discovered that it is only an appearance. Yet it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that there are no such things as appearances at all. An appearance seems neces- sarily to mean one of two things, either (1) a perception, or (2) simply a sensuous image. In the former case a judgment is-