Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/183

 THE AMBIGUITY OF TRUTH. 169 almost as severe a control over the intellectual as over the moral eccentricities and nonconformities of its members ; indeed it often so organises itself as to render the recognition of new truth nearly impossible. Whatever therefore indi- viduals may recognise and value as 'true,' the 'truths' which de facto prevail and are recognised as objective will only be a selection from those we are subjectively tempted to recognise. There is therefore no real danger lest this analysis should destroy the ' objectivity ' of truth and en- throne subjective licence in its place. A further convergence in our truth-valuations is produced by the natural tendency to subordinate all ends or purposes to the ultimate end or final purposa, 'the Good'. For in theory, at least, the ' goods,' and therefore the ' truths,' of all the sciences are unified and validated by their relation to the Supreme Good. In practice no doubt this ideal is far from being realised, and there arise at various points con- flicts between the various sorts of values or goods, which doubtless will continue until a perfect harmony of all our purposes, scientific, moral, aesthetic and emotional has been achieved. Such conflicts may, of course, be made occasions for theatrically opposing 'truth' to 'goodness,' 'virtue' to 'happiness,' 'science' to 'art,' etc., and afford much scope for dithyrambic declamation. But a sober and clear-headed thought will not be intolerant nor disposed to treat such oppositions as final and absolute : even where under the circumstances their reality must provisionally be admitted, it will essay rather to evaluate each claim with reference to the highest conception of ultimate good which for the time being seems attainable. It will be very chary, therefore, of sacrificing either side beyond recall ; it will neither allow the claims of truth to oppress those of moral virtue nor those of moral virtue to suppress art. But it will still more decidedly hold aloof from the quixotic attempt to conceive the sphere of each valuation as independent and as wholly severed from the rest. IV. We have seen so far that truth is a form of value, and the logical judgment a valuation ; but we have not yet raised the question as to what prompts us in bestowing or with- holding this value, what are our guiding principles in thus evaluating our experience. The answer to this question takes us straight into the heart of Pragmatism. Nay, the answer to this question is Pragmatism, and gives the sense in which Pragmatism professes to have a criterion of truth. For the pragmatist contends that he has an answer which is simple, and open to inspection and easily tested. He