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 116 NEW BOOKS. The differences I have discussed may seem to some to invalidate the classification of Dr. Schultz as a pragmatist ; but I hardly think them so important. For they do not affect the method of his reasoning and indeed seem to be mainly differences in the use of words. Still less do they detract from the merit of his present enterprise, which aims at subjecting the conceptions of physics to sympathetic philosophic criti- cism. If philosophy is ever to raise herself out of the undignified position of a discarded handmaid of theology who preys parasitically on the religious instincts, it will not be by the arts of a story-teller, but by devoting herself steadily to the correlation of scientific results. And that in this direction lies a wide field of usefulness who can doubt ? For in physics especially the most startling discoveries are being made. That science already believes herself to have witnessed the death of ' indestructible ' matter ; if she can be equally fortunate in attending its birth, she may find that the life of the universe is more nearly akin to our own than any but primitive animists had suspected, and that alchemy comes at the end as well as at the beginning of science. And in any case we stand on the brink of a great extension of that regnum hominis which is the final test of truth for man. F. C. S. SCHILLER. Elemente der Psychologie des Urteils : vol. i., Analyse des Urteils. Von Dr. ERNST SCHRADER. Leipzig : Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1905. Pp. 222. In this the first volume of his work on the Psychology of Judgment the author deals with the 'analysis of judgment,' i.e., with the elements that are explicitly recognisable in any single judgment. The second volume, entitled Tendenzen der Urteilsbildung, is to deal with all those factors and influences which, like education, society, study, etc., determine our judgments without as such appearing in any single judgment. The fundamental Thesis of this volume is set forth in the preface : ' The experiences of error explain the difference which exists between judgment and the mechanical combination of ideas in accordance mainly with the laws of association '. In working out this idea, the author attempts to steer a middle course between Association and Psychical Activity. With Lotze and others he holds that the laws of Association are incapable of explaining judgment, mainly because they fail to account for the fact that we can withhold our assent from any combination of ideas as brought before the mind by association. From the point of view of association any combination of ideas produced by the psychological mechanism must be regarded as a judgment, which is to neglect the additional element of assent which constitutes the differentia of judg- ment. In short, Association fails to explain the possibility of error. It merely ' prepares the materials ' for judgment. To what, then, must we ascribe the assent ? We cannot, with Lotze, refer it to a special activity of the soul, for in Psychology we can only deal with the facts as revealed by introspection and self-observation, and psychical activity is not such a fact. It may for all that exist, for introspection is by no means co- extensive with consciousness, and we are, therefore, conscious of many things, e.g., feelings, emotions, etc., of which introspection reveals nothing. For introspection is an intellectual act, and therefore deals only with sensations and ideas (Empfindungen und Vorstellungeri) and their com- binations. But since psychology is based on introspection, its ex- planation of judgment must restrict itself to the facts as revealed by ntrospection, even though it should thereby deal only with the ' acci-