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 112 NEW BOOKS. sche's glorification of might, and by which the conception of duty, so all-important for Kant, is ignored or boldly rejected. The real thesis of the book is that these two extremes have their common root in a false dualism, or radical opposition between morality and actual human nature. The difference between them is, that, whereas Kant infers that actual human nature must be suppressed in order that a transcendental moral law may prevail, the opposite type of theory regards this law as a fiction with which actual human nature is at variance. The part that deals with Kant occupies more than half the volume. After an introduction designed to bring out by contrast the peculiar character of the Kantian ethics, M. Fouillee proceeds to examine crit- ically the argument of the Critique of Practical Reason. The discussion deals successively with the conception of a pure practical reason, which is submitted to a lengthy criticism, the conception of a formal im- perative, and finally the conception of freedom. In spite of the evident care which M. Fouillee has devoted to this part of his argument, and the somewhat diffuse elaboration with which he has developed it, it seems to me the least effective part of the book. The questions at issue be- tween a formal rationalism like Kant's and any teleological ethics are so broad and fundamental, that one expects a criticism of corresponding breadth, a criticism such as M. Fouillee's own thesis above-mentioned suggests. What he actually gives us, however, is a criticism of a highly technical nature, which requires a constant reference to the scholastic details of the Kantian system. And, even apart from this mistake in tactics, I think the technical criticism itself will not appeal to present- day disciples of Kant as a really searching or successful examination of the master's teaching. In spite of M. Fouillee's close attention to the details of Kant's ethical system he seems to show too little sympathy with and appreciation of its significance as a whole. A single instance must suffice. Referring to Kant's description of our consciousness of the moral law as a "fact of reason," M. Fouillee asks: "Comment peut-il y avoir dans la raison pure un fait, fait qui n'a rien d'empirique, qui n'est meme pas un fait veritable ? Quel fait peut etablir le pour"ir de causalite qu'on attribue a la raison pure ? II n'y a devant nous qu'un seul fait, a savoir que nous, homines civilises et socialises, nous cono un devoir, lui attribuons un pouvoir de realisation par notre intennediaire. et eprouvons une impulsion correlative, qui reussit en une certaine mesure. C'est cette conception, cette impulsion et ce pouvoir qu'il s'agit precise"ment d'examiner, pour voir s'ils ne s'expliqueraient pas autrement que par la causalite supra-sensible et par 1'objectivite d'une loi formelle universelle. II faudrait prouver que c'est bien la raison pure qui cause a elle seule la determination de la volonte appelee devoir. . . . II faudrait prouver que c'est bien la seule universalite de la loi qui, iu'l.'- pendamment de son contenu, came un interet intellectuel et rend ainsi la raison pure pratique par le fait ; que c'est bien la forme seule qui agit cornrne cause, pour determiner le vouloir independamment de toute matiere et de toute fin : tu dois " (pp. 55-56). If Kant has not been trying to prove any of these things one wonders what he is supposed to have been doing in the Analytic. But it is significant that M. Fouillee elsewhere complains that Kant does no more than analyse the conditions of the possibility of duty. The second part of the book deals first with Hedonism, and then with the ethics of Nietzsche's " Wille zur Macht ". The criticism of psycho- logical and ethical Hedonism is brief, and contains little that is not , already familiar to students of ethics, but it gives an excellent re- statement of the objections usually taken to these doctrines. The remaining section on Nietzsche is longer, and constitutes an admir-