Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 15.djvu/112

 98 CRITICAL NOTICES : coatead that they are true in the precise form in which they have been stated," and this is often accompanied by the remark that they have been derived from " inspired persons," " an ancient tale," or simply " somebody " (is eyw v-n-6 TO/OS irf.irti<Tp.ai, Phced., 108, C). Such language is the sure mark (o-^payis) of a myth, and we never find it applied to the doctrine of Ideas anywhere, though the rela- tion of the individual soul to the Ideas may be (and, we shall see, must be) mythically expressed. The Ideas as such never enter into a myth at all Even in the Phadrus myth, they appear but for a moment, and then with their usual technical names. There is no attempt to represent them mythically or even allegorically. Now this is just what we should expect if we take seriously Plato's quite unambiguous and of ten -repeated statement that the Ideas alone are completely real and therefore completely knowable. Our knowledge of them, if we have it at all, is completely adequate to its object. We know completely what ' the equal ' and ' the double ' are, even though we have never seen any equal or double ' things '. We know what ' the good ' and ' the beautiful ' are, even though there are no good or beautiful ' things ' in our world. Here we have completely adequate knowledge and there is no room for myth. It is only when we come to the world of sense, the world of becoming, that adequate knowledge ceases to be possible. If we are to understand Plato, we must start where he starts, with the reality of the intelligible ; if we start from the sensible world, the way to the Ideas is barred, and we become involved at once in profitless discussions as to x (a P t(r f Ji ^> *he " hypostatising of abstractions " and the like. Now it is fortunately not necessary for our present purpose to examine how Plato was able to pass or, if you like, supposed himself to be able to pass from the intelligible to the sensible. It is enough for us to know that he did make the passage without, in his own view, giving up in any way his belief in the reality of the intelligible or taking refuge in a doctrine of " two worlds ". As we are dealing with myth, it will be quite sufficient for our purpose to take the account of the matter which is given in the Timceus. The doctrine which this dialogue implies is simply that, if it is good there should be a sensible world, there will be one ; the ' Idea of the Good ' implies its realisation. In order, however, that this may take place, something else, identified in the Timaus with space (xW) is " necessary " as a ' receptacle ' for it to be realised in. We therefore infer the necessary existence of space. This, however, is a " bastard inference " (voOos Aoyr/xos) ; for we can have no knowledge of space as such. It is a " strange form of existence," " barely credible," and partakes of the intelli- gible "in a very mysterious way " (airopwrard 7n/). It is not " comprehensible by thought " (^po^o-ei TrepiXr/TrroV). It follows that the rest of our discourse will have to operate with an unknown quantity and can no longer be called scientific. It is at best a profitable and innocent form of ' amusement ' (TratSia), which the wise man will indulge in ' to repose himself ' (draTrauo-ews