Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/94

 80 S. F. MACLENNAN : does not entitle him. For if the Real is to be constituted by meaning, if the indeterminateness of felt experience inevitably resolves itself into the determinateness of relational experience, this Ideal Whole must be taken as the final Eeality. Of this necessity Green appears to have been conscious to a certain degree. Throughout his work he endeavours consistently to reduce feeling to relation, while, at the same time, he appreciates instinctively that immediacy must be included and not reduced 1 within the Absolute. This unsolved problem of Green forms the starting-point of Bradley's contribution to English speculative thought. While admitting the value of Green's work, he insists upon its limitations. He recognises that if meaning constitutes Keality, thought inevit- able falls into contradictions. In the first part of Appearance and Reality he has applied this insight in detail, and has shown specifically that the fallacy of substituting the abstract for the concrete leads universally to the dialectical illusion which causes us to take regulative principles for metaphysical entities. Sub- stantive and Adjective, Eelation and Quality, etc., when set up as absolute, contradict themselves and turn out to be mere Appearance. Meaning is relative; it is Appearance and not Reality. This is the burden both of Appearance and Eeality and of the Logic. Meaning cannot constitute Reality ; for every en- deavour to substantiate it lands us in hopeless contradictions. For this reason Bradley recognises a distinction between " existence " and " content ". " Existence " is direct) and immediate experience, experience felt and not reflected upon, the inexhaustible store- house of reflective construction. " Content " embodies the results of reflective activity. In its completeness it is determinate and inclusive but abstract. Meaning realises itself in symbols. It sacrifices colouring to definiteness. As matters stand, therefore, we must admit the point of Bradley's contention. Reflexion is essentially a transforming of the immediate and given. It is also a substituting of a fragmentary though definite experience for that -which was more complete though quite indefinite. It may be that a reason for such high-handed procedure on the part of Reflexion can be given, but it must be admitted that such a reason is required. To grant the contention, however, is to admit that meaning cannot constitute Reality. This raises a further question: "Has meaning a legitimate function?" At first it might appear as though Reflexion were essentially destructive. If we take the position that Reality resolves itself into meaning, then we must admit that thought involves itself in hopeless contradictions. If again we measure meaning in terms of the immediately given, we shall be forced to accept Bradley's conten- tion that thought mutilates Reality. If still further we recognise that the difficulties and contradictions of thought are brought to light through the operation of thought, we shall be led to think that some solution of the difficulty is possible. But this solution 1 Cf. Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 51, 50.