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 554 NEW BOOKS. ferent periods. The third section will prove very suggestive reading, and is a careful analysis of the fundamental ideas of the first part of the Critique of Judgment, with a view to show their connexion with Kant's conception of genius. The conclusion of the whole inquiry given on pp. 40.3-424 is an admirably concise statement of the many sources from which Kant borrowed or derived his opinions. As regards the argument of the work one may remark in the first place that there seems to have been surprisingly little change in Kant's con- ception of genius from first to last. Almost exactly the same views are held in the first stage as at the last ; the difference being mainly one of fullness of exposition and accuracy of distinction (cf. p. 244 ff. and p. 314 ff.). One is astonished also to find what little first-hand knowledge Kant had of art, and indeed what extremely slight natural capacity he had for appreciating this side of experience. He could not understand music, and only knew painting and the plastic arts at second hand through "Wincklemann and Mengs (p. 300). Music he regarded as an " importunate art," a remark which doubtless had its origin, as Dr. Schlapp suggests, in Kant having lived too near the Konigsberg State prison, and been compelled to listen to bands when out at a military dinner (p. 328) t While again, " den Begriff des Geschmackvollen erlautert (er) ... an der anspruchslosen Form einer Schnupftabaksdose von Papiermache " (p. 300) ! Literature was the only art on which he could pass a judgment at first hand ; and even here one cannot find a perfectly trustworthy guide in a critic who thought Pope's Essay on Man a literary master- piece, and considered that novel reading weakened the memory and injured the character. Regarding the main thesis, one point is very sig- nificant. On the one hand, the discussion of Genius in the Critique of Judgment is not only very short ( 46-50), but admittedly falls outside the systematic division of the work itself (p. 303). Dr. Schlapp even admits with Cohen that it should have been left out altogether. His view of genius moreover in the Critique is, if not contradictory, at least ambiguous (pp. 329-334). On the other hand, Dr. Schlapp has sought to show that the theory of genius is the source of the conception of " formal purposiveness," of " necessity " in judgments of taste, of " a priori prin- ciples of taste," of a " proportion between the mental powers," of the " free and harmonious interplay of imagination and understanding " all of which occupy a large place in Kant's Critique of Judgment. The theory of genius in fact gave rise to Kant's conception of the beautiful, and not conversely (p. 388). The Critique of Judgment is the result of fusing his theory of genius with those ideas on Taste which appear in the early lectures. Some interesting points come out incidentally concerning Kant's gen- eral theory of knowledge. One of these may be mentioned. It appears that the idea of criticism as a scientific method first started in connexion with the analysis of Taste. Kant remarks that there can be no science of the beautiful ; we can only have a " Kritik " (cf. pp. 44-45, 92). In this respect Logic and ^Esthetic are considered alike, and for a long time in Kant's history are treated on similar lines, the one being a " Kritik " of understanding, the other of feeling. J. B. BAILLIE. UEtica Evoluzionista : Studio sulla Filosofia Morale di Herbert Spencer. Da GUGLIELMO SALVADOR,!. Torino, 1903. Pp. xv, 476. This work falls into two main divisions, of which the first is expository,, while the second, which fills rather more than half the volume, is nomin-