Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/548

 534 f CRITICAL NOTICES: duction of the Hegelian's bugbear, the Theologian's "outside designer " : but the outsideness is put there by Mr. Haldane, not by the unfortunate Theologian. Are not " inside " and " outside " in such a connexion wholly misleading spatial metaphors ? What- ever may be thought of the legitimacy of " inferring " design from the behaviour of plants and animals, there ought to be no hesita- tion in recognising such behaviour as purposeful, when once we have got from general metaphysical considerations the right to think of the ultimate Eeality as " self -consciousness ". Or are we to deny to the ultimate Eeality the highest kind of mental activity which we allow to its "phase," the so-called individual self? Mr. Haldane 's treatment of the categories employed in life and in consciousness and in purposeful human action is as thorough as his space permits. And yet I cannot but feel that in some ways the problem is a more difficult one (if it is not an impertinence to say so) or, let me say, one less easy of solution by the simple formula about different " aspects of reality " than Mr. Haldane conceives. I feel a doubt whether Mr. Haldane does not imagine that the 'pathway to reality,' when duly entered upon under Hegelian auspices, is a shorter cut than it is. The recognition that Biology involves categories which are absent in Physics, and human action categories which the merely biological view does not require, cannot prevent the raising of many important and difficult questions as to the conflict between these points of view. It is true no doubt that plants, animals, and men act in a way w T hich cannot be explained from the merely mechanical point of view without interfering with the conservation of energy, that the human body is a machine which obeys all mechanical laws, but which acts very differently from a mere machine. But it is doubtful surely whether this principle the introduction of fresh categories without mutual interference is applicable all through. Each Science deals with some abstract "aspect of reality," but that very fact makes the conclusions of one Science liable not merely to onesidedness but to error. The Metaphysician must not merely pronounce each Science right in its own way ; he must co-ordinate them where they come into collision or seem to do so. And therefore he cannot help asking himself the question : " Does not human action in a sense violate other mechanical laws, though it does not violate the conservation of energy, i.e., does there not come a point where the physicist, applying his physical laws, would necessarily make a prediction which is not justified by the event?" Would he not necessarily predict that, given all the conditions of which Physics can take cognisance, a certain man will remain seated ; while as a matter of fact he gets up and walks ? Must we not admit (as Prof. Ward has urged) that "somewhere within the living organism physical events will happen that have other than physical conditions" (Naturalism and Agnosticism, i., p. 73) ? This may be admitted