Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/503

 IV. THE DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENT. BY G. E. T. Boss. THE main object of this paper is to try to determine the import of the disjunctive judgment and to find out the exact place which it occupies in the connected whole of logical thought. The point which I wish to raise first is as to the question of the exclusiveness of the judgment. I wish to bring up certain arguments to combat the theory held by Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet when they declare that in the disjunctive judgment (A is either B or C), properly interpreted, the alternatives B and C are exclusive of each other. It is my intention rather to uphold the view of Mr. Keynes, who is quite as sure that the common proposition with ' either ' is merely an alternative judgment and that B and C do not, according to the mere form of the thought, necessarily ex- clude each other. It seems to me that there are several considerations based on common logical usages which go to show that Mr. Keynes is right. Mr. Bradley (Principles of Logic, p. 124) allows that the form of words " A is either B or C " may sometimes be used when we do not wish to deny that A may be both B and C, but he declares that, when using this expression, we leave out of sight the contingency that A may be both B and C, and finally asserts that, in such cases, our language is slovenly, implying that if we wished to be accurate we should say " A is either B or C or both B and C " all the alternatives being exclusive. We might criticise this con- clusion and ask how it is that B C can be exclusive of B and C when as a matter of fact it includes them. If alternatives are necessarily exclusive of each other we shall have to make our judgment still more pedantic and -say " A is either B alone or C alone or both B and C " " He is either merely a fool or merely a rogue or both a fool and a rogue ". The mere fact that in order to make our disjunction