Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/480

 466 c. M. WALSH : KANT'S TEANSCENDENTAL and from our dreams ; for these latter exist only in the individual, are only " subjective," but the former exist also in the single experience, world, time, space, consciousness, outside every individual man, are " objective " in both the senses of being alike for all men and of being objects distinct from the individual subject's representations of them. Un- experienced real phenomenal objects are no longer merely experienceable objects ; they are actually experienced in the one consciousness, they are real objects in the one experience. And now two or more men may be literally said to sensibly perceive the same thing ; for though their representations of it are distinct, yet the object can be the same, being a single outside thing in the one phenomenal world. Thus the same object of many men's many representations is no longer merely the transcendental object or thing-in-itself, but it is a phenomenal object, and yet outside us in an outside space and time, and corresponding to (and resembling) the many representations in the many men. 1 Still, in Kant's opinion, such outside objects are not transcendental, but are empir- ically real, because they are objects in an experience, although we should have to regard them as transcendental so far as they are supposed to be outside of human experience. The holding of this realism is facilitated, if not induced, by the ambiguous use of two terms. The first of these is the term "outside me " employed in connexion with the terms "outer" and "extended," and, by contrast, with "inner" and " inside me ". In the terms " outer " and " outside me," used interchangeably, Kant admits two distinct meanings. On the one hand he refers to anything extended in space (having parts outside parts), and on the other to anything existing as a transcendental object, independent of me, whether in space or not. This doubleness of meaning he pronounced " unavoidable," yet sought to avoid it by calling the former "empirical outsideness " and the latter "tran- scendental outsideness ". 2 Now the objects empirically put- side me he views as- still inside me, because extended things that are objects for me are in my space, which is in me (of. iii., 599). Thus a distinction arises also in the terms "inner" and "inside me"; for, in contrast with the pre- ceding, Kant applies these terms to empirical objects that 1 Cf. " Das Dasein der Gegenstande im Kaum ausser uns " and " ausser mir " in the Widerlegung des Idealismus in the 2nd ed. of the Kritik. Also : " In so fern ist also der empirische Realismus ausser Zweifel, d.i. es correspondirt unsern ausseren Anschauungen etwas Wirkliches im Eaume," iii., 602 (1st ed.). 2 III., 600-601 ; c/. 603-604 ; iv., 84-85.