Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/476

 462 c. M. WALSH : KANT'S TKANSCENDENTAL is most apparent in his treatment of unexperienced real phe- nomenal objects. Now, one of his two treatments of such objects may be expounded as follows ; for so the case seems to have presented itself to him. Objects such as the walls of this room, which I now actually see or feel, exist only as phenomenal objects in my sense- perception ; for they vanish the moment I shut my eyes or walk away. Ceasing to exist when I do not sensibly per- ceive them, they have no existence apart from my sense- perception of them they are objects only in my sensibility. If, then, there is any object existing unaffected by my action, or by the action of other percipient beings, it is only the unknown, never sensibly perceived " transcendental cause " of the phenomenal wall I did sensibly perceive, the " tran- scendental object " or, may be, the thing-in-itself, which latter, however, according to the above - described Transcendental Idealism and Transcendental Eealism, does not exist in space and time, and is not a sensible object for me even when I am beholding the phenomenal wall. While my eyes are shut, I may imagine the walls to be where they were when I saw them, and also think of them as being there ; but they are not really there, since the thing-in-itself is nowhere, and the phenomenal object has vanished, and my imaginary wall is not real (for, while somebody else was watching it, the wall may have tumbled down, although I still continue to imagine and to think of it as standing). Yet while I have no reason to think (to believe) that the object, which others may be experiencing, and which I might experience if I chose, has changed, I continue to speak of the object as if I were still experiencing it, that is, I treat my imaginary wall as a real phenomenal wall because I judge it to be a sufficiently accurate representation of the real wall which I should, I think, the while be experiencing, had I kept my eyes open. Thus this imagining is clearly distinguished from the mere imagining of fantastic shapes and events, or from dream-pictures, which I have no reason for believing to be correct representations of any objects which I or others could experience. Such are objects produced in the minds of some men, with no reason for supposing them to be directly caused by any corresponding transcendental object, they are merely subjective. As for past events, or distant or minute objects, I may similarly think my imaginary objects (which I have formed from hearsay or from history, or by arguing from effect to cause) to be correct representations of objects which I should have experienced had I been there and then, or which I could experience had I more powerful