Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/474

 460 c. M. WALSH : KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL that other corresponding states may exist is at least possible. But this thought does not constitute Kant's Empirical Realism ; for there is nothing empirical about such realities. They are not objects in our experience, and so, in a way, as Kant says, they are not objects for us, 1 and he even says they are nothing for us, 2 though by this statement he does not mean that they are absolutely nothing. On the contrary, if existing, they are the absolute realities, the term " reality " here being used not in an empirical but in a transcendental sense. In other words, this is the doctrine of Transcendental Realism in respect to Things-in-themselves. 3 These two transcendental doctrines, then, are perfectly consistent, each with itself and each with the other. The one means that transcendentally taken, that is, outside of ourselves, sensible objects do not exist, and there are no objects resembling them. The other means that in that outer region, though there may be objects corresponding to our sensible objects, they do not resemble them in any particular whatsoever, so that their nature must be wholly unknowable to us. The two fit together perfectly. But it cannot be said that Kant's empirical doctrine his doctrine of Empirical Realism in respect to Time and Space and the Sensible Objects in them is self-consistent, or altogether consistent with those others. It is a fact which has been mostly overlooked, that Kant gives two distinct accounts of this Empirical Realism. These deserve to be carefully distinguished. Empirical Realism deals with the empirically and phenom- enally real, or the reality in experience or in phenomenon. Of such reality Kant gives, and frequently repeats, all uncon- sciously, two totally distinct definitions. The one is that the !. phenomenally real is the matter of our sense-perceptions, or simply our sensations themselves ; the other, that the phenomenally real is that which corresponds to the matter of our sense-perceptions, or simply to our sensations. 4 The 1 III., 399. 2 III., 350, 571 ; iv., 84. 3 A doctrine of this sort, but confined to the consideration of space, and also not positively but problematically stated, had been advanced twenty-seven years before Kant wrote the Kritik, by Condillac in his Trait^ des Sensations, part iv., ch. v. Condillac, as well as Kant, drew from Leibnitz. 4 The second is the more common, as in iii., 144, 158 n., 160, etc. The first is given along with the second in the following : " Alle aussere Wahrnehrnung also beiveiset unmittelbar etwas Wirkliches irn Raume, oder ist vielmehr das Wirkliche selbst," iii., 602, and the last is repeated on the same page. Now in Wahrnehrnung is both intuition and sensa-