Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/469

 KANT'S IDEALISM AND EEALISM. 455 in the one is contrasted with a term in the other tran- scendental with empirical, and idealism with realism. As by " empirical " is meant reference to what may be experienced, so by " transcendental " is meant reference to what cannot be experienced because of its being, or being taken to be, beyond experience, or outside the realm of experience, the idea of which, however, is supposed to underlie our experi- ence. And as by " realism " is meant a doctrine of reality, so by " idealism " is meant a doctrine of unreality : the " ideal''* is made to mean what is only thought of, not having any- thing to correspond to the thought, what is therefore falsely thought of, and is nothing ; by " ideality " is meant nothing- ness. By " the transcendental ideality of phenomena," Kant tells us, he means merely that " outside our representations," i.e. transcendentally taken, " they are nothing ". 1 In fact, for " Transcendental Idealism " Kant might equally well have employed the phrase " Unempirical Unrealism ". As these terms admit of being used interchangeably, and as they are applicable both to intuitions and phenomena and to things-in-themselves, it is possible to form of them eight combinations, descriptive of eight doctrines, although some of these may overlap and coincide. Four of them are doc- trines held by Kant, and four are doctrines rejected by Kant. The four held by Kant are the following : (1) Transcendental Idealism of Intuitions and Phenomena. That intuitions and phenomena are nothing beyond experi- ence. (2) Empirical Idealism of Things-in-themselves. That things- in-themselves are nothing in experience (i.e. that they are not experienced). (3) Transcendental Realism of Things-in-themselves. That things-in-themselves are real beyond experience. (4) Empirical Realism of Intuitions and Phenomena. That intuitions and phenomena are real in experience. The four rejected by Kant are the following : (5) Transcendental Realism of Intuitions and Phenomena. That intuitions and phenomena are real beyond experience. (6) Empirical Realism of Things-in-themselves. That things- in-themselves are real in experience. (7) Transcendental Idealism of Things-in-themselves. That things-in-themselves are nothing beyond experience. 1 III., 356, cf. 63, 68, 347. The references are to volumes and pages of Hartenstein's chronological edition, in eight volumes, Leipzig, 1867-68. Vol. iii. contains the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, vol. iv., 1-131, the Prolegomena.