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 428 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. lediglich als elastische, Bander zu betrachten sind, deren Zugkraft aus- schliesslich bestimmt 1st : erstens durch ihre Lange, zweitens durch ihre Temperatur ".] T. Lipps. ' Fortsetzung der " Psychologischen Streit- punkte ". iv. Zur Frage der geometrisch-optischen Tauschungen. v. Zur Psychologic der " Annahmen".' [The first of these critiques deals with the recent papers of Witasek and Benussi ; the author finds in their re- sults confirmation of his own theory of the geometrical optical illusions. The second consists of a series of brief notes upon Meinong's book Ueber Annahmen.] Literaturbericht. ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. Bd. cxxi., Heft 1. Eduard von Hartmann. ' Die Psychophysische Causalitat.' [Neither the epiphenomenal theory, nor the double-aspect theory, nor subjective idealism is true. There is a genuine action and reaction between body and soul. To understand it we must adopt the dynamic theory of matter. And we must distinguish between materialising and non-materialising forces. The former, which produce the appearance of- solidity and extension, radiate from a central point : they attract and repel ; they are subject to the law of action and reaction. These consti- tute the inorganic world. The latter (non-materialising) are not central, and otherwise have their own laws. They appear along with vital phenomena, which can only be understood by assuming their activity. But they are subject to the conservation of energy. Then, again, mind is composed of a conscious and an unconscious layer, between which what the author calls ' allotropic causality ' obtains. In this way we get an intelligible connexion between the will and the muscles as well as between the organs of sense and the intelligence.] Prof. Dr. Zahlfleisch. ^ Die Gefiihle als Symptome Psychischer Abnormitat.' [The feelings are nuisances, symptoms of a disordered mental condition which it is im- portant to set right as quickly as possible. The first step is to define as precisely as may be the particular feeling experienced, the second to ascertain its cause, and the last to prevent its recurrence.] Dr. Edmund Neuendorf. ' Anmerkungen zu Lotzes Weltanschauung,' [Lotze can- not be tied down either to monism or to monadology. Sometimes he seems to lean to the one and sometimes to the other. Such inconsistency was of a piece with his whole intellectual character. There are rigidly consistent philosophers who, starting with two or three principles, push them to their logical conclusions. Others of a more hospitable and genial, turn take in ideas from all quarters, and have something to offer readers of all tastes. These stimulating eclectics, of whom Lotze was one, are perhaps more helpful than the stricter sort.] Prof. L. von Bortkiewicz. ' Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und Erfahrung.' [A controversial paper on the theory of probability impossible to summarise here.] Theodor Elaenhans. ' Theorie des Gewissens.' [Conscience consists primarily of ethical feelings. These are called up by single words and, in a much greater degree of intensity, by represented actions. The particular note of the ethical feelings known as conscience is that they relate to our own self. Further, they are always related to actions, and specifically to actions affecting the weal or woe of living beings, and involve a sym- pathetic representation of the feelings produced in such beings by the related actions. As motives conscientious feelings claim an unconditional supremacy over every other motive. Into the mental experience so defined and isolated there enter as variable constituents a number of dis- tinct feelings such as family affection, honour, patriotism, and religion ; and also feelings associated with the objects or abstract interests art and science for instance whence duties are derived. The result is a remarkably complex feeling closely analogous to the coensesthesis in