Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/44

 30 THOMAS WHITTAKER : experiment, the methods of the physical and natural sciences, there is added introspection. This peculiar method is the condition of there being a science of Psychology at all. It has indeed been ascertained that the physiological functions of the brain are in some way concomitants of what is known to us introspectively as mind ; but no observation of those functions, and no experiments, would have revealed the exist- ence of mind in special relation with organisms if mental phenomena had not been known to us through our having reflected on them. Hence the proper name of the new science is not Cerebral Physiology, but Psychology. By ''Animal Psychology" in the diagram is not meant Comparative Psychology, or the study of the various mani- festations of mind in different species of animals. This is a "concrete science". The fundamental or abstract science in relation to it is constituted by the study of mental synthesis in general previous to the formation of the Concept. Without this kind of synthesis, the actual phenomena of the human mind would, of course, be inexplicable ; and, as it is common to man and at least the higher animals, the abstract science that deals with it may from that circumstance receive a name. Under this head may be studied the elements con- tributed to mind by the senses, and their grouping in ac- cordance with the laws of association first ascertained by analysis of the phenomena of memory. Here already we have elementary forms of Emotion and Will, and of Reason as intelligent adaptation of actions to practical ends. The higher, and properly human, form of intelligence appears only with conceptual Thought. To the Psychology of Man the transition is through Sociology, regarded as a fundamental and abstract science. Comparison of the various forms of human society is a con- crete science, like Comparative Psychology. The funda- mental character of Sociology is proved by its introducing a new mode of relation, namely, the relation between organisms that live in community and become capable of intellectual converse. In the evolution of human society, we must suppose that the passage has taken place from vague interchange of feeling and co-operation for common ends, to mutual understanding of ideas and fixation of a system of signs by which thought can control action. From the uttered sound associated with an image has been evolved the word which stands for a concept. On Human Psychology the remark may suffice for the present that of course the power of conceptual thought modifies everything else. Perception, emotion and will are