Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/430

 416 NEW BOOKS. Von Fuhlen Wollen und Denker Eine Psychologische Skizze. THE ODOR LIPPS. [Heft 13 and 14 of the Schriften der Gesellschaft fur Psycho- logische Forschuny, Sammlung 3.] Leipzig : J. A. Barth, 1902. Pp. viii., 196. Einheiten und Relationem Eine Skizze zur Psychologie der Apperzeption. THEODOR LIPPS. Leipzig : J. A. Barth, 1902. Pp. iv., 106. Prof. Lipps is in a way the despair of the reviewer, particularly of the reviewer whose space is sternly limited by editorial command. This is partly because of the extraordinary amount of psychological material which he contrives to compress into so small a space, but partly, alas ! also because of his own somewhat perverse love of elaborate classifica- tions and subdivisions which it fairly passes the wit of man of one man at any rate to retain in the memory for ten pages together. It is quite impossible to give anything like a conspectus in brief compass of the argument of his two pamphlets of which the second is a sort of semi-independent appendix to the first ; but both, especially the first, must be heartily commended to all readers who care for subtle psycho- logical analysis and are willing to weary the recalcitrant flesh in the pursuit of it. The former and longer monograph, modestly described as a " sketch," leaves hardly any problem of the effective and conative side of mental life untouched. The author's general point of view may be gathered from his definition of feelings as " the immediate symptoms in consciousness of the ways in which psychical processes are related to the soul or complex of mental life ". It follows of course from such a defini- tion that the varieties of feeling must be infinitely numerous, and the main object of the work is to reduce this infinite manifold to some sort of order by means of a system of classification too complex to be briefly described, but ultimately depending upon a threefold subdivision of all feelings into (1) perceptive and apperceptive ; (2) object-feelings and perception- (or apperception- ) feelings ; (3) feelings of freedom and of constraint (gebundenheit). Particularly suggestive is the discussion of wish and will (ch. vi.). of feelings of value (ch. vii.), and of "obligation" (ch. ix.). The main thesis of the second and briefer sketch are that all relations are psychologically either relations between an apperceptive subject and the object or relations between objects " established by my apperception," and similarly that every form of " unity " is ultimately the creation of the subject's act of "apperception". "The concepts which govern all our thinking . . . are not taken from perception or sensation, but are modes of apperceptively uniting a manifold, which are founded on the nature of mind ". Thus Prof. Lipps comes, as he says, to the Kantian position, and like Kant exposes himself to the serious question " is the antithesis between ' taken from perception ' and ' founded on the nature of mind ' ultimately sound ? " A. E. T. RECEIVED also : E. C. Broome, A Historical and Critical Discussion of College Admission Re- quirements, New York, Macmillan Co., 1903, pp. 157. Snider, Ancient European Philosophy, 1903, Chicago, Sigma Publishing Co., pp. 730. Strong, Why the Mind hcu a Body, Macmillan Co., 1903, pp. x, 355. Villa, Contemporary Psychology, Swan Sonnenschein, 1903, pp. xiv, 396.