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 H. SIDGWICK, Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau. 385 the failure to attain it intellectual or not ? How can it conciliate Egoism and Universalism, or be non-competitive? How can it be abiding, and how can it give guidance? I should have thought that all these questions would answer themselves from the point of view which I have tried to take above, in dealing with the alleged gap between Green's Metaphysic and his Ethics. Let us take (p. 37) " Green here seems to say that satisfaction of desire is extinction of desire, but self-satisfaction certainly does not mean self-extinction ". The continuation of the passage which Sidg- wick has just cited from the Prolegomena runs, " In that sense the desire is at once a consciousness of opposition between a- man's self and the real world, and an effort to overcome it by giving reality. . . ." Is it not plain that what is meant is an extinction of the consciousness of opposition in the point in ques- tion, and a satisfaction in the reality which the effort has brought into existence? But (p. 40) a course of action is described by Green as a man's Good, although attainment is supposed absent. Therefore it would seem, the author urges, that the good may mean merely what is preferred as an end, and be independent of the satisfaction of accomplishment. If so, there could be no illusion in the choice of objects as good. But all this, and more of the same kind in Lecture IV., seems to depend on the separation of Will and Intelligence which it is Green's object to deny. If the human spirit possesses, as Green contends, a definite structure and logic in dealing with the objects of life, then it is satisfied in as far as what conflicts with this nature of its own is harmon- ised and overcome. And it is plain that a realisation of this kind is a matter of degree, and begins as soon as an idea, in harmony with the law of the self, begins to move towards realisation within it. But this cannot mean that mere volition is good without at- tainment of real actual good. Will and effect are two inseparable sides of every action, and you cannot judge part of it by one standard and the rest by another (Memoir, cxlvi.). A Will which does no good at all surely cannot be a good will. At best, it would equal the predominance of an idea which had no meaning in the real world and so no trace of power to harmonise. It would be insanity. A will which, for example, harmonises the more re- fractory parts of a man's own disposition, though apparently in- effectual outside him, is the realisation of a certain end, and I think Green would call it (sect. 376) " a constituent " part of the good, in its own nature. The gulf between the two writers is perhaps most apparent where Sidgwick complains that he finds " unqualified egoism " on one page, and "unmediated universalism " on another, and where he raises objections to the alleged non-competitive character of the true good. To Green, I suppose, the onus probandi (Psychological Hedonism being out of the field) would have seemed to lie with those who raise these difficulties. Man has a certain nature, which, so far as we can see, works, though under hindrances,, 25