Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/398

 384 CRITICAL NOTICES : of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, ancient and modern, seems to be founded." It was necessary for Green to disclaim this traditional opposition between Desire and Eeason, as opposing "motives" in the direction of the Will, before he could establish his own theory of Will and Desire, according to which the conflict in a vicious choice is between Eeason and better Eeason (sect. 179). His criticism of the expression "conflict between desire and reason " does not, therefore, in itself mean that he ignores the wilful choice of wrong. He repeatedly (137, 179) adopts the phrase that a man knows the better and prefers the worse. The sole point in his view which raises a difficulty is that which attributes man's conduct whether virtuous or vicious to an idea of his personal good (e.g., sect. 115). Can such a term be- truly applied to the choice of wrong known to be wrong (Sidgwick, p. 25)? It has to be remembered in judging of this point that the wrong, though known to be wrong when chosen, can hardly be chosen for its wrongness, but must be chosen for the posi- tive element within it on which self-assertion can be founded. Therefore there is a clear meaning in saying that in a vicious choice man takes for his personal good, for that in which alone at the moment he can assert himself, something which he knows to be wrong, that is to say, to be opposed to a fuller self-assertion which his momentary self can conceive, but cannot attend to so as to make it effective. He takes as his good what he knows to be bad. The expression may be too paradoxical ; the important point is, i., to remember that it is the partial good in the vicious act which alone he can desire, and, ii., if a weaker expression, e.g., " what is personally chosen," is adopted, not to let it obscure the fact of the realisation of the man's nature positively in his acts, in vicious as in virtuous conduct. . I am greatly struck in re-reading the Prolegomena with the distinct account of Will as " the action of an idea impelling to its realisation " (sect. 152). I do not think that Sidgwick does justice to this point on page 28. On page 26 something has gone wrong, possibly in the revision. The words quoted from the Prolegomena, page 147, as describing the aim of Green's argument, are used by Green to describe what he is argu- ing against, viz., the conception of a will which is not desire. On the other hand Sidgwick seems right in urging such an idea as that of posthumous fame against Green's requirement that the idea which precedes volition must be that of oneself doing or enjoying (sect. 31) : only perhaps it might be rejoined that you can hardly will posthumous fame immediately, and in as far as you will any act as a means towards it, it might become possible to apply Green's definition. The real solution, no doubt, lies in the con- tinuity of the self and the world. Lectures III., IV., and V. deal with Green's conception of self- satisfaction, the True Good and Self-sacrifice. The author finds the idea of self-satisfaction indistinct, in regard to such questions as : Is it always present in the fulfilment of Desire and how ? Is