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 BRIEF CRITIQUE OF " PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM ". 379> plex network of relations. Our science builds itself up and gains, the legitimate respect of all the other students of science according as it is able to amplify and make more accurate man's knowledge of these relations. It actually finds the relations to be far more deep-seated, as it were, and indefinitely more intricate than had formerly been supposed. And although psycho-physical science, like all the other most nearly allied sciences, has been discovering, facts much more rapidly than it has been able to establish legitimate generalisations, or formulae, or laws, upon the basis of these facts, this science is hopeful as to future discoveries. But if the sum- total of its announcement of results no matter with what flourish, of trumpets or expanding use of scientific phraseology the announce- ment may be made comes only to this : Every psychical event, no matter what, is paralleled by some physical or nervous event, we know not what, then, for my part, I shall blame no w r orker in any other field of science for neglecting and despising psychology. What occurrences in consciousness are dynamically, or otherwise, related with precisely what occurrences in the bodily organism ? What are the formulae that express these relations? What are those most general principles of their behaviour and their relations in that reciprocal dependence which characterises the development of the body and the development of the mind? and, How may we, in accordance with the facts, conceive of the essential nature of each? these, and such as these, are the problems before psycho-physical science. And the scientific barrenness, coupled with its mythological vagueness, of the hypothesis of psycho- physical parallelism has been, in my judgment, a distinct detri- ment to the cause of a progressive psychology. It has done what all statements that employ ill-chosen figures of speech always do ; it has obscured the real state of the case, and the real issues at stake. 9. But, finally, our philosophical nature is no more satisfied to leave the problem of the relations of man's body and man's mind in the condition in which both the popular conceptions and the work- ing theory of science leave it, than to leave any of the problems which appear before the mind in so unsettled a condition. The philosophy of Mind, like all philosophy, seeks to establish the higher and the profounder unities. It finds the life of the soul and the life of the body united in experience in a manner which, while it is per- haps no more ultimately mysterious or even more suggestive than the temporary union of oxygen and hydrogen (whose formula we know), is of infinitely more ethical and aesthetical interest. This union is also, as I have already said, infinitely complex and subtile ; and the more we examine it, the more do the complexities and subtleties of it come to view. Ontological consciousness seeks then to be satisfied. It requires some tenable conception of a real bond, or underlying unity, for body and mind. And as philosophy reflects upon the data of facts and laws which psycho-physical science hands over to it, philosophy sees ever more clearly that this bond