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 THE PEOBLEM OF CONDUCT. 371 earlier. There seems the less justification for this as in doing so he separates himself in principle from Mr. Bradley whose lead he in general accepts. He recognises indeed that there is a difference between his own treatment and that of Mr. Bradley in his well- known chapter on " Goodness " in Appearance and Reality, but he sets it down as one of detail, apparently on the assumption that the doctrine of the latter work differs essentially from that of the Ethical Studies. There seems no evidence for such an assump- tion. It is true that in the earlier book the contradiction which leads beyond morality is that implied in an unrealised ideal in general (" If real how realise ? if realise then not real "), in the later it is sought for in the ideal itself. But the elements that fall apart in the ideal are not the individual and society but self-assertion and self-sacrifice, the distinction between them being defined as one not of the contents which are used but of the different uses that are made of them. This is not the place for criticism of Mr. Bradley 's doctrine. I wish merely to point out that it is different in principle from that in the text, where the contradiction is taken I think to be one of content. Connected with this is the further difference that while in the writer's argument the emphasis falls on the irreconcilability of the elements Mr. Bradley never loses sight of the other side of the dialectic, viz., that in principle and actually the features that ap- pear to be in contradiction must in the end coincide. True the ' end ' is also the end of Goodness as such. But this only means that morality depends upon the belief in a unity which, if realised, would carry it into a region where without ceasing to be real it would cease to be ' morality '. Mr. Taylor would not, I think, deny this : the difficulty is to see how it is connected with the argument in the earlier chapters which aims at demonstrating a radical and irreconcilable contradiction. The criticism on the Pleasure theory that follows in the chap- ter on " Pleasure, Duty and the Good," while in agreement on the whole with current idealism, parts company from it on the question of the possibility of a sum of pleasures. The disagreement as in some other points seems more verbal than real. Freed from the obscurity already noticed as to the sense in which ' permanence ' of wants is to be taken and from the reference to finality of satisfac- tion which hardly seems compatible with his own argument Mr. Taylor's statement might have been taken from Green himself : "It is not a mere succession of satisfactions but a succession of satisfactions in which a permanent want finds an ever-widening realisation along the same lines that we really mean to make us contented. A mere series of satisfactions bound together by no unity of aim and marked by no progress would hardly be finally satisfactory to any one." A more serious matter is the treatment that the conception of Duty receives in the remainder of the chapter. This of course is a