Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/342

 328 MAEY WHITON CALKINS : these so-called single and independent realities is not only self-identical and like others, but is also either cause and effect or in reciprocal relation : in other words, the bare plurality turns out to be a system of related reals. The second form of the composite reality theory is incom- parably more important than the first, for it wears the specious semblance of a theory of unity. It is the conception of ultimate reality, not as an aggregate of unconnected indi- viduals, but as a Whole a unity of inter-related parts. Fichte's Absolute Ego, which turns out to be the system of inter-related egos, and, indeed, every conception of the universe as the organic unity of independent but related selves is an illustration of this theory. Such doctrines of an apparent unity really, as he affirms, a plurality Hegel invariably opposes by the explicit teaching that ultimate reality is not a whole of parts, but logically prior to the parts and itself the relating principle. But, incredible as it seems, Hegel never carefully considers this significant and historic- ally important theory of ultimate reality as a system of co- ordinate parts. Instead of assuming its validity, analysing its implications and making it disclose its own weakness, he rarely, if ever, frames a serious argument against it. To the writer, this neglect is, beyond doubt, the greatest and the most inexplicable defect of Hegel's Logic. There is not lacking, however, though Hegel never made adequate use of it, a demonstration, quite in the spirit of Hegel, of the fallacy of this theory of reality as an inclusive whole of co-ordinate, inter-related individuals. For what, it may be asked, is the whole ? It may be defined, perhaps, as a sum of the relations of the distinct, yet connected parts. What, then, is the relation ? It cannot, in the first place, be external to the parts which it relates, else it would be itself another form of reality and would need to be related with all the rest; and the new relation would again need relating, and so on ad infinitum. 1 And yet, though relation cannot, thus, be other than the related individuals, it can- not, on the other hand, be merely an attribute of one or more of these individuals, else the whole of connected realities would be merely that plurality of distinct and unrelated in- dividuals. There is no escape from this difficulty except in the conception of a whole which is also a singular ; and this 1 Of. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 32. " How the relation can stand to the qualities is ... unintelligible. If it is nothing to the qualities then they are not related at all. . . . But if it is to be some- thing to them then clearly we now shall require a new connecting relation."