Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/317

 II. HEDONISM AMONG IDEALISTS (II.). BY BEBNARD BOSANQUET. III. I return to point (1) of section 102, the author's con- tention that " the idea of Perfection cannot give us any criterion of moral action ". What has been said above, first as to the true nature of a good criterio t n as (a) essential and not extraneous and (b) con- crete and not abstract, and secondly as to the true process of judgment which is parodied by Hedonic calculation, belongs in substance to the present argument. It only needs to be applied to the author's contention in three respects, (a) as to his ruling out the work of a criterion in hindering self- deception ; (b) as to the assumption that the idea of perfection can only be applied by comparison in the abstract ; and (c) by showing that the process on which we rely is not confined to development of ideals as contrasted with their satisfaction. (a) The argument of section 104 I am not sure whether it is directed against Green amounts to ruling out the moral danger of self-deception. Yet I should have expected Mr. McTaggarfc to accept the principle " Quicquid petitur, petitur sub specie boni" ; and if so, there is no immoral choice which does not depend at bottom on self-deception. Even apart from this principle, the field of possible self-deception in morals is certainly enormous and extends over almost all, if not quite all, strictly ethical choices. Thus, I submit, it is a serious error of theory to separate the moral and intel- lectual elements of the choice. But this is, as it seems to me, the essence of Mr. McTaggart's argument. The sup- posed moral agent he urges ex hypothesi intends to do right, before he knows what the criterion says. Otherwise, he asks, of what use could a moral criterion be to him ? If he is not going to be deterred from a choice by its being shown to be wrong, he can have no use for a criterion that tells him which choice is right and which is wrong. This argument is directed against an alleged fault in the reasoning