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 280 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. 'what is ' ; says that this latter distinction is universally recognised ; identifies such recognition with the admission that ' reason,' as distinct from ' brutal fact,' is not an ' empty word ' and does ' exist ' ; and finally concludes that ' as all possible theories of reason may be reduced to two, empiricism and idealism,' the problem ' what right is ' admits of two and only two solutions, the empirical and the idealistic. In II. M. Dunan professes to show that ' Hobbes' theory ' (taken as representative of empiricism) is untrue ; but, since he identifies throughout the most obviously diverse propositions, it is impossible to discover precisely what he does hold to be untrue. In III. we find (in contradiction to I.) that 'empirical philosophy' is 'only acquainted with facts,' and hence naturally could not solve the problem. To demand a solution from idealism ' means ' that right is only an ' absolutely necessary ' ' idea ' ; and the solution is that ' reason renders all persons, qua persons, perfectly equal to one another ' ; or that ' right is unity and identity in God of all reasonable beings ' ; or that ' right is diversity but equality of persons before human consciousness '. IV. ' Right is not, but wishes to be,' and, for the attainment of its wish, it must (1) become 'definite' 'for each individual ' ; (2) ' find in the world of facts a force with the will and power to support it'. Condition (1) necessitates the substitution of 'positive' for 'ideal' justice, since the latter is 'impossible either to conceive or to realise '. The State fulfils condition (2) ; yet its legislative 'intervention ' cannot be justified by its mere utility, but only by the fact that every one obeys it voluntarily, which is the case, since every one wishes ' social life,' and therefore also the obedience which is a means to it. V. War is not constituted by open violence but by any endeavour of two parties to secure incompatible objects 'without caring to observe justice, and when nobody can impose it on them'. Against Hegel's praise of war between nations is urged (a) that the better nation might be found not always to win ; (/>) that the argument ' war is justified as a means to the survival of the very qualities which cause victory in war ' is a ' vicious circle,' and necessitates the inference that the utility of these qualities consists in the production of war, just as that of war consists in their production ! Hence there should be an ' international institution ' to enforce justice, although a ' peace imposed from without ' might have ruinous effects ! ' And besides ' ' competition ' is sufficient to ensure the ' pre-eminence of the best,' and is always ' kept within the bounds of justice ' !] A. Landry. ' Quelques reflexions sur 1'idee de justice dis- tributive.' [A refreshing contrast to M. JJunan. Will only consider what principles ought to guide the State in the distribution of 'economic goods,' not e.gr., of honours, etc. I. Removes misunderstandings about the nature of the ' impartiality ' which is essential to justice : different people must be treated in the same way unless ' a different treatment can be justified by the same principle ' which justifies the general rule of treat- ment ; a just ' equality ' does not require that every one should be in the same circumstances, but only that, if they are, they should be treated alike. But this ' essential element ' of justice is ' formal ' : it only tells us to apply some principle impartially ; the question ' What principle ? ' may be answered generally by ' Promote the public good ' ; but this 4 end ' includes many different ends, and it is plain a priori that we can only decide approximately what method of distribution will best promote the whole. II. What end do the ordinary formulae of distributive justice imply ? These are : (1) To each in proportion to his services ; (2) to each in proportion to the quantity of his labour ; (3) to every man the same ; (4) to each in proportion to his needs. (1) and (2) are mainly means of maximising the amount of ' economic goods ' produced ; whereas we tend