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 VII. PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS. PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xi., No. 4. E. B. McGilvary. 'The Consciousness of Obligation.' [We may accept Kant's distinction be- tween the hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Corresponding to the former is the consciousness of conditional or teleological obliga- tion ; corresponding to the latter is that of absolute obligation. (1) The consciousness of teleological obligation has reference to the relation objectively existing between an action, its known result, and the desiderative attitude the agent takes towards that result. We say to ourselves : Do this, because you want that. In analytical terms : " the reasoning process of a person with a definite desiderative nature takes place in a concrete situation, and produces a result, of which a definite desire in its particular strength is a part. Such a desire is therefore properly called a concretely reasonable desire." The function of ideals : there is nothing peculiar about the obligation imposed by an ideal, that should differentiate it from other teleological obligations. (2) Kant's definition of the categorical imperative cannot be accepted ; for there are imperatives which are taken " by human beings as unconditionally bind- ing on them, and yet which are not 'objectively necessary' in the sense of being 'valid, not merely for men, but for all rational creatures generally ' ". The categorical imperative is " a consciousness of uncon- ditional obligation which in normal cases has reference to some more or less definitely conceived action or disposition, but which only in certain instances is regarded by the subject experiencing it as binding " in the Kantian sense. It is due, in some small measure, to the economy of mental short-hand, the reason dropping out of the command ; but chiefly to the ' suggestive ' influence exerted by the word of command as such. (3) In sum, then, there are the analytically teleological imperative, which is reasoned ; the analytically categorical but genetically teleological im- perative, which has been reasoned ; and the analytically and genetically categorical imperative, which never was reasoned.] J. Dewey. ' The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality, n. Its Significance for Conduct.' [The genetic method "unites the present situation, with its accepted customs, beliefs, moral ideals, hopes and aspirations, with the past. . . . Whatever can be learned from a study of the past is at once available in the analysis of the present." The method " eliminates surds, mere survivals, emotional reactions, and rationalises (so far as that is possible at any given time) the attitudes we take, the ideals we form ". Both empiricism and rationalism, in different ways, deny the continuity of the moralising process ; their ultimates are timeless, and hence absolute and disconnected. "If our moral judgments were just judg- ments about morality," the results of the historic method " might be of scientific worth, but would lack moral significance, moral helpfulness. But moral judgments are judgments of ways to act, of deeds to do, of habits to form, of ends to cultivate. ... To control our judgments of conduct ... is in so far forth to direct conduct itself."] W. Smith.