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 NEW BOOKS. 271 liberum arbitrium, but self-determination, and is identical with indi- viduality of character. These results, closely identical with the doctrines of our recent English " idealists," are reached along lines of reason- ing mainly based upon acute observation of historical and psychological fact, and scarcely dependent at all on the metaphysical constructions of post-Kantian philosophy. To some of us they are perhaps all the more satisfactory in consequence. Mr. Wentscher's affinity with Nietzsche comes out in his interpreta- tion of Freedom as at once the end and the presupposition of Ethics. For a free agent the ultimate ideal must be freedom itself, the actual xercise of a will which is the expression of self-determining character. Freedom is thus the same thing as the highest possible development of the individual will, and we must say with Nietzsche, " Will maketh free ; this is the true doctrine of will and freedom ". Freedom is thus not an initial datum or endowment of human nature ; in the original capacity to reflect on our acts, we have merely a predisposition towards freedom ; freedom itself has to be won by the actual habitual exercise of self- determined volition. Mr. Wentscher's book falls into two principal parts. In the first, after a brief introduction which identifies the subject-matter of Ethics with the phenomena of conscience, he analyses the processes of con- science themselves. The general outcome of his analysis is to distin- guish three main influences which determine the self -approbation and self-censure of individuals in various proportions at various levels of culture. Approbation is bestowed first and with least conscious reflex- ion on the qualities which give the individual an enhanced sense of power and importance (the noble values of Nietzsche), next, under the influence of social tradition, on qualities which are found useful to the community at large (the utilitarian values), finally, where systematic individual reflexion has set in, on all that extends and develops the individual's power of free self-determination. The individual's approba- tions and censures of this last reflective kind constitute the " intellec- tual " conscience. Examining the various attempts of ethical theory to formulate ultimate moral axioms for the guidance of the intellectual conscience, the author rejects the claims of empirical Eudsemonisrn to prescribe principles for conduct. He decides that ethical axioms can only be obtained by an a priori idealistic method, and argues at length that the various ideals of individual perfection, social equity, etc., are all special modifications of the general principle that a potentially free being should aim at the highest development of a true individuality. In the second part of the volume the author discusses the various objec- tions brought against the concept of free agency by the various types of determinism, and seeks to show their fallacious character. He is usually felicitous in his criticism of the determinist assumption, but one may perhaps suggest tha f. it is a weakness in his treatment of the subject that he is willing to admit the domination of rigid causal uniformity, as actual, except in the ethical sphere. One would have liked some ex- amination of the whole idea of " causal law ". Until we have discussed the claim of the causal scheme to give truth anywhere, it is a doubtful assumption that moral freedom means the exemption of human conduct from conditions elsewhere valid. A. E. T.