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 IN THE MATTER OF PERSONAL IDEALISM. 227 operation of the eternal ideas in the Divine intelligence, controlling God's communication of sensations to us, yet the assumption of this Divine Mind is unwarranted by the strict Experientialism from which the theory takes its departure. One might have supposed that all this was settled beforehand, from the time of Locke. But in spite of its title, we find in the Oxford volume Experientialism running at large and everywhere : we find, in fact, (1) empiristic epistemology, (2) an organised new assault upon a priori cognitions, (3) a voluntarism of the most pronounced order, (4) ethical mysticism combating the mysticism of the intellect, and, finally, (5) a quasi-personalism resting upon the wholly experiential and purely temporal existence of conscious " individuals " added as a society to his own eternal being by the creative fiat of God. In short, not a single trait of systematic Idealism is present ; the heart of real individuality, of real person- ality, is not reached, nay, even the serious attempt to reach it is foregone; yet the whole is brought under the name of Personal Idealism. The force of misnomer could hardly farther go. One good, however, we shall in all probability reap out of the issuance from Oxford of a co-operative book with this title, and with the contents embraced : the attention of all the thoughtful in the English-speaking world, and even far beyond it, will now surely be drawn to the vital questions involved. Thence it may be hoped that the genuine idealistic implications of freedom, of evolutional limits, of valid moral valuation, and of justified en- thusiasm for the ideal, will more and more clearly come into view. Not until this occurs, certainly, shall we get finally rid of those plausible makeshifts in the way of philosophy that leave our chief ideal interests still at risk, and so only serve to prolong the weary procession of philosophic disputes. But I must pass on to deal more directly with my own attempt at contributing to this idealistic quest, and with Mr. McTaggart's very suggestive review of my book. I am much indebted to my reviewer for the care and the penetration with which he has con- sidered my theory ; and yet I notice some important respects in which he has failed to take my meaning. These I must set forth with all possible clearness, in the hope of preventing further mis- understanding ; and then I shall have to reply to the objections which he raises (or, perhaps rather, the difficulties which he sug- gests) in connexion with my view. I. Judging by his other published writings, as well as by his review, I may fairly assume that Mr. McTaggart is in agreement with me in holding to an idealistic Pluralism, an eternal Society of many minds, each absolutely real. It is well to note, in setting out to comment on his criticisms, that there is a head under which his