Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/178

 164 F. H. BEADLEY: idea has even partly realised itself, is contained as an ele- ment in the content of the idea. But at the beginning of the act my self is not always so contained. And after a certain point the process, we have seen, may wholly pass beyond my knowledge and being. 1 Then is the idea of agency, I may be asked, not essential to will ? This idea in my opinion is present usually, but I do not think that it is essential, and I even think that in some cases of will it is absent. We always experience the process, when it happens, as our agency, but, before the process happens, agency is not a necessary element in the idea. In other words the idea of an altered not-self, I think, is enough, even if that idea does not contain the feature of an active altering. Let us suppose that at an early stage my self in some point has been expanded into the not-self, and let us suppose that, without experiencing this process as an act, I have perceived it as a change in which my self has flowed over into the not-self. Let us again suppose that later this same change is suggested in idea, and that myself is felt as identified with this ideal change. The process which follows and realises this idea will be experienced as my agency, 2 and this process, I submit, is also an act of volition. On the other hand the element of agency was not present beforehand in the idea. And if the process, being without such an element in its idea, is denied to be volition, this to myself, I would repeat, matters little or nothing. The process in any case will give at least the perception of agency, and on the next occasion that element, having now been perceived, will tend to qualify the idea. "But it is the perception of agency," I may probably be told, " which is here really in question. Agency and the experience of it are things one or both of which are ulti- 1 We may ask whether the idea, before it realises itself, need even be the idea of my future state. The idea must be felt inwardly as mine, and it must qualify the not-self which comes to me and which so far qualifies me. The idea must thus in its content be the idea of a change in me. But, if you ask whether the idea is that of a change in myself as distinct from others, the question is different. The doubt is whether a change of my not-self, even where my not-self is in felt opposition to an idea felt as mine, must therefore be qualified in the idea as a change of myself as distinct from other persons or things. And I cannot main- tain the affirmative here. But, since the idea in its actual process at once goes on to qualify itself, the inquiry, as I have explained in my text, seems to have no importance. 2 It will be so experienced, that is, except under certain conditions dis- cussed later in this article.