Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/171

 THE DEFINITION OF WILL. 157 both objects at once. The main idea which moves me must be felt to be present in each, and it therefore, in relation to each, is a higher idea. If upon this follows my identification of myself with one of these objects, and so my volition, the act is Choice if it is qualified by the idea of rejecting the other. If on the other hand any feature in the above account be wanting, I no longer in any proper sense have chosen. A child desires two lumps of sugar, and from some cause perceives that both at once are not possible. Each piece excites the pleasant idea of taking and eating, and both still do this when an attempt to take one piece has brought in, and checked itself by, the perception of losing the other. The impracticable ' both ' which is desired is in fact the cause of a moment's suspension. Then through the pressure of appetite or from some other cause an action ensues, and the idea of taking now is actually realised. But whether the child has really chosen remains uncertain, and it entirely depends on the following condition. Was the idea of leaving one piece an element present in the act, or did for the moment the idea of this piece disappear simply ? Choice in the latter case will be absent, while in the former it exists. There is choice because the idea, which acted, in the first place qualified both pieces, and then one piece with the aspect of leaving; the other. And so much, I contend, is essential to choosing. On the other hand there is contained here no idea of an end with its means, and certainly no judg- ment that one piece is nicer or is wanted by me more. 1 To resume, when I choose I must have before me two ideas under one head, and one of these ideas, when I act, must be qualified as excluded or at least as absent. If I merely lose sight of one idea, I have not really chosen. Hence choice cannot appear below a certain level of mental development, and most obviously it does not constitute the essence of will. Choice is perhaps not reached at all except in the case of human beings. I will go on from this to remark upon the meaning of Consent. Prof. James (Psych., ii., 568) has used this, term to express the ultimate fact in action and belief. 2 I have already explained how far I can agree to call such ex- periences ultimate, and I will now point out why in the case of either action or belief the use of consent is really 1 Mr. Shand, in MIND, N.S., No. 23, pp. 801 foil., appears to me to have seriously misapprehended the facts on this point. 2 I do not know if this was suggested by Lotze's use of Billigung, Med~ Pysch., p. 802. I have already remarked on approval, Mind, N.S., No> 44, p. 453.