Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/165

 THE DEFINITION OF WILL. 151 this second object is a not-self which is opposed to the idea and to myself. And we have then the process in which the inner self carries itself out into this not-self. Everywhere, to pass from this special instance, we must bear in mind a general result. An element, which in one sense is a not- self, may in connexion with an act of will take a different position. And this is a point to which I must invite the attention of the reader. The not-self in a volition is always more or less particular and limited, and it is limited, we may say, for the purpose of the volition. Beside those internal feelings which have not even the form of a not-self or object, there will be tracts even of our outer world which for the moment will share their position. They will not make part of that not-self which opposes the idea and our volition. They will on the contrary fall back into that general mass which is felt as myself, a mass which in various degrees qualifies me as in the idea I oppose myself to the not-self and so carry myself out. In will (to repeat this) the not- self which conflicts with the self is but one part of my world. The rest will lie within that self which is one with the idea, and will to a varying extent in the conflict support the idea and the self. On the whole, we may say, and in the main there is between my world and my will no discrepancy, and, if it were otherwise, life could hardly be lived. Even the extreme case of suicide throws no doubt on this truth. Eor there is never even there an opposition between my world and the mere will for its negation. The conflict on the con- trary is always between various elements within the self and its world, and it is this whole which in exceptional cases is distracted fatally. The same general result holds good also, but with a difference, in the case of the theoretical relation. The object for perception or thought is never the mere whole reality. Our object is a partial appearance in which and as which the reality is for us, and in the end the op- position is between the concrete reality felt as a whole and this its partial appearance. 1 But in this conflict I as dis- tinct from my world cannot actively take part. In will on the other hand the conflict is between myself, as expressing the main reality and the true self and as identified in feeling with the idea of a change, and over against this some exist- 1 An idea is false, we may say, in so far as the reality cannot be expressed by it without conflict, and a will is bad in so far as the idea fails to express the genuine nature of myself. In this article I am concerned only, it will be understood, with the formal essence in which all volitions agree, and I pay no regard to any substantial ' or ' material ' differences between them.