Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/164

 150 F. H. BEADLEY : There is on each side a discrepancy between existence and idea. The idea both is and is not the adjective of the not- self ; and the same thing again is true in the case of the self. From the one side as limited by actual existence I am not changed, and on the other side I feel that I am qualified by the idea of the change. I feel myself one with the ideal change in its opposition to the actual existence. Hence the process which carries out into fact the content of the idea, realises for me my inmost being which before was ideal. And because I am aware of the idea as itself making the change a point which will shortly be discussed and ex- plained I am aware also that this change is the work of myself. In the result therefore I have expressed myself harmoniously on both sides of the relation. The attitude of theory presents us here with an important contrast. The theoretical not-self, as we so far find it, may be discordant in various degrees, and the reality may more or less conflict with the idea which endeavours to express it. And in this discordance, since it qualifies me, I may suffer internally, and by its removal, so far as it is removed, I may feel myself expanded and satisfied. But the process here is experienced as in the main the self-realisation of the object. The process can hardly be alleged to be made by the idea, and most certainly the process is not made by myself. My self in one with the idea is not opposed to the object, but on the contrary I follow the fortunes of the not-self, and receive from that inactively my part in its failure or success. I may will to think and to perceive, and in some thinking and in some perception there is doubtless will. But this will is not aimed at an alteration of the object itself. Its end is the appearance of the object in me as apart from any will of mine the object is real. And an attempt to make the truth other than it is by my will would at once subvert or at least transform my position as perceiving or thinking. (v.) There are several points on which I will now en- deavour to obviate misunderstanding. The existing not-self is not always my external world, but may consist in any existence of and within myself which is opposed to me. 1 We have here within the whole, which is felt as my present being, the opposition of two objects. We have the idea of a change in some existing feature, and together with this first object comes the feeling of myself as specially one with the change. But, on the other side and as a second object, we have the actual feature of myself as I exist in fact, and 1 Gf. here my Appearance, p. 97.