Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/162

 148 F. H. BRADLEY: to myself except so far as I enter into the content of this idea. How far I must so enter is however a question which must be deferred for the present. 1 (iii.) This practical identification of self with the idea may be called specific, 2 and we cannot explain it in the sense of accounting exactly for its quality. On the other hand we can indicate the distinctive feature which it adds to mere theory, and we can show some conditions which its presence implies. This may be done most clearly perhaps in reply to a possible objection. " The self," it may be said, " is iden- tified alike with every one of its contents, and, as to the idea, you admit that the idea is an object and a not-self. Is not then the special oneness of the idea and the self something which in the end is meaningless?" In replying to this ob- jection I shall have in part to repeat what I have put forward already. In the practical relation we can find in the first place an existing not-self. There is an object, and it is felt as mine though as other than me. And we have in the second place an idea which conflicts with this existence. This idea once more is an object, and it is felt likewise as mine, and felt likewise again as other than myself. And so far we have no aspect, it may be said, which is not found in mere theory. For we have two objects in relation or two elements of one complex object, and each of these is mine and is not- mine in precisely the same sense. But we have so far left out of sight the essential and differential feature of the case. The idea in collision with the existence, although it is an object and a not-self, is also, in its conflict with the exis- tence, felt specially to be mine and to be one with myself. Hence this special feeling attaches itself to but one of the two objects before me, and it qualifies that one in its actual opposition to the other. The existence therefore, being opposed to what is specially one with myself, becomes ipso facto itself opposed and contrary to me. And I, in my union with the idea, am in conflict with existence. And 1 This is the question as to how far self-consciousness is present always in will. 2 We must however be careful to avoid exaggeration on this head. I consider that apart from the practical attitude the self can be aware of the agreement or disagreement of its own felt content with that of the object before it. I think that such a sameness or difference may be felt, and the feeling then translated into a judgment. And, if this were not possible, we should I think find it difficult to account for some aspects of self -consciousness. This is a matter however with which I cannot deal here.